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D In this paper, it is shown that a three-valued autoepistemic logic provides 
an elegant unifying framework for some of the major semantics of nor- 
mal and disjunctive logic programs and logic programs with classical nega- 
tion, namely, the stable semantics, the well-founded semantics, supported 
models, Fitting's semantics, Kunen~s emantics, the stationary semantics, 
and answer sets. For the first time, so many semantics are embedded into 
one logic.The framework extends previous results--by Gelfond, Lifschitz, 
Marek, Subrahmanian, and Truszczynski - -on the relationships between 
logic programming and Moore's autoepistemic logic. The framework sug- 
gests several new semantics for negation-as-failure. In particular, we will 
introduce the epistemic semantics for disjunctive logic programs. In order 
to motivate the epistemic semantics, an interesting class of applications 
called ignorance tests will be formalized; it will be proved that ignorance 
tests can be defined by means of the epistemic semantics, but not by means 
of the old semantics for disjunctive programs. The autoepistemic frame- 
work provides a formal foundation for an environment that integrates dif- 
ferent forms of negation. The role of classical negation and various forms 
of negation-by-failure in logic programming will be briefly discussed. <1 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper introduces a unifying framework for some of the major semantics of logic 
programs. It will be shown how the stable semantics, the well-founded semantics, 
supported models, Fitting's semantics, Kunen's semantics, answer sets, and the sta- 
tionary semantics can all be captured by one three-valued autoepistemic logic. The 
framework extends previous results by Gelfond, Lifschitz, Marek, Subrahmanian, 
and Truszczynski on the relations between logic programming and autoepistemic 
logics [16, 24, 38]. 
The framework is motivated by the following considerations: 
• A unifying framework for different semantics is expected to facilitate their 
comparison. It seems impossible to say something new in the area of normal 
programs; the mutual relations between their semantics have already been 
extensively investigated, from many points of view, in [24, 4, 36, 37] and 
many other papers. However, the unifying framework might help to com- 
pare the various semantics for disjunctive programs, which have not yet been 
investigated so deeply. 1
• The study of the relations between logic programs and autoepistemic theories 
shows how logic programming techniques can be used to implement subsets 
of autoepistemic logic. From another point of view, the same relations legit- 
imize the use of negation-as-failure for knowledge representation a d belief 
modeling. 
• The framework suggests everal new semantics for negation as failure that 
overcome some of the limitations of the old semantics. 
• However, no single form of negation seems to be satisfactory for all appli- 
cations. This fact is leading to a never ending proliferation of semantics. 
Apparently, it is always possible to find an example where the existing se- 
mantics do not have the desired behavior. This problem might be solved by 
more flexible logic programming languages that allow different forms of nega- 
tion to be expressed at the same time. Among other benefits, such languages 
would yield a better trade-off between inferential power and computational 
complexity, by allowing the more powerful--hence more complex--semantics 
to be applied only to the subprograms that really need their power. The au- 
toepistemic framework suggests how to obtain such a language: by allowing 
the belief operator to occur explicitly in rules, one can express many different 
forms of negation-as-failure (possibly new ones) and make use of many forms 
of negation in one program. 
• Finally, the framework might help to answer two old questions: Is classi- 
cal negation really needed in logic programs? What is the non-monotonic 
formalism underlying logic programming (or is there one)? 
It is impossible to include in one paper a complete study of all these potential 
applications of the framework. Thus the paper focuses only on a few aspects. 
ARer an introduction to three-valued autoepistemic logics (Section 2), we will show 
how the semantics of normal programs can be captured by these logics (Section 
4). Then we will focus our attention on disjunctive programs (Section 5). After 
1Another contr ibut ion to this area is due to Dix [10]. It is a classification based on abstract  
propert ies uch as cumulat ivity.  
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showing how the stationary semantics is captured by three-valued autoepistemic 
logics, we will introduce a set of new semantics, called epistemic semantics, that 
are naturally suggested by the framework. In order to motivate the epistemic 
semantics, we will introduce the notion of ignorance tests. It will be shown that 
ignorance test can be easily defined through the epistemic semantics, while they 
cannot be satisfactorily defined by means of the existing forms of negation as failure, 
no matter what representation method is adopted. Section 6 outlines the relations 
between three-valued autoepistemic logics and answer sets. Finally, in Section 7, 
it will be shown that one of the three-valued autoepistemic logics is sufficient to 
capture all the semantics of the framework. 
Several comments and short discussions about the other applications of the 
framework can be found across all sections, and especially in Section 8. 
We assume that the reader is familiar with logic programming and autoepistemic 
logic. We refer to [21] for the basic notions about logic programming, and to 1136, 
37] for an interesting lobal view on the major semantics of negation-as-failure. We 
refer to [27] for the basic definitions and properties of autoepistemic logic. ~[~hc 
proofs of the results on the strong and weak well-founded semantics of disjunctive 
programs assume notions (like active derivation, basis, global tree, level) that c:an 
be found in [35]. 
Some proofs and technical lemmas have been moved to the Appendix; such 
lemmas are nmnbered "A.n." 
2. THREE-VALUED AUTOEP ISTEMIC  LOGIC  
It is well known that {-~Lp --+ p} has no stable expansions. The reason is that this 
set of premises is ambiguous: 
• If p is not believed (i.e., -~Lp is true), then p follows from the premises and 
hence p should be believed. 
• Conversely, if p is belived (i.e., Lp is true), then p does not follow from the 
premises and hence p should not be believed. 
In both cases, p should be believed and should not be believed at the same time. 
In other words, this set of premises provides reasons both for believing p and for 
not believing it. 
Another famous example of ambiguous premises is {~Lp -+ q, ~Lq -~ p}. These 
premises have two stable expansions: in one of ttmm, p is believed; in the other 
one, p is not believed. In other words, these premises also provide reasons both for 
believing p and for not believing it. 
A cautious agent should not make arbitrary decisions: if some ambiguous premises 
provide a reason to believe p and a reason for not believing p, then p should be 
neither believed nor disbelieved. This is the main intuition underlying three-valued 
autoepistemic logics. The rest of this section is devoted to formalizing it. Some of 
the definitions and results contained in this section appeared in [5-71 .
2.1. Definitions 
The language of autoepistemic logic is a propositional modal language, £L, with 
standard connectives (V, A, ~--, and 7) and one modal operator L, to be read ~s 
"know" or "believe." 
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The sentences where L does not occur are called ordina~T or objective. The set 
of ordinary sentences i denoted by £. The sentences where propositional symbols 
occur only within the scope of L are called subjective. The sentences of the form 
L~b (where ~b is an arbitrarily complex ~L sentence) are called autoepistemic atoms. 
The following abbreviations will be used: 
X = £L \X ,  
Ord(X) = X A£. 
Autoepistemic logics model the beliefs that an ideally rational and introspective 
agent should hold, given a set S of premises (i.e., axioms or basic beliefs). In Moore's 
logic, the beliefs of the agent are represented by means of a set of sentences. In 
the three-valued autoepistemic logic, a slightly more complex structure is needed 
in order to model doubtful agents. 
Definition 2.1. A belief state B is a pair (B +, B - ) ,  where B + and B-  are disjoint 
sets of £L  sentences. 
Intuitively, B + is the set of statements that are believed by the agent, while B -  
is the set of statements that the agent has no reason to believe. The remaining 
statements of the language are those about which the agent is doubtful, that is, 
such statements are involved in an ambiguous piece of knowledge. 
We say that a belief state /3 is complete iff B + U B-  = £L .  Belief states are 
partially ordered by the natural extension of set inclusion, defined as follows: 
B1 C_B2i f fB +C_B + an.dB 1CB~- .  
Union and intersection are extended to belief states in a similar way. It is easy to 
verify that the set of belief states, extended with the above ordering, is a complete 
lower semilattice (see [1.2] for the definition). There is one minimal element ± = 
(~, 0), but many maximal elements, corresponding to complete belief states. Next 
we introduce the models of our language. 
Definition 2.2. A propositional interpretation is a pair (I, B), where I is a classical 
(two-valued) interpretation of Z: and B is a belief state. 
A propositional interpretation ( I ,B )  is also called a B-interpretation. A B- 
interpretation is complete iff B is complete. 
Intuitively, in a propositional interpretation (I, B), I models what is true in the 
"outside world," while B models the agent's beliefs. I assigns a classical truth value 
to ordinary atoms, while B defines a three-valued truth assignment to autoepistemic 
atoms. Nonatomic sentences are evaluated by extending strong Kleene's valuation 
to the connective +--, which is interpreted in a nonstandard way: "~b ~-- or" should be 
read as "If a is true, then also g? is true." With this definition, implication satisfies 
the implication theorem. As usual, implication coincides with classical implication 
when both ~b and ~r are defined. This informal description is made precise by the 
following definition. 
Definition 2.3. The valuation ~I,B associated with a propositional interpretation 
(I, B) is defined as follows: 
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If p is an ordinary atom, 
true, if I ~= p, 
121'B(P) = false, otherwise; 
true, if ¢ ~ B +, 
12I,B(L¢) = false, if ¢ ~ B- ,  
undefined, otherwise; 
true, if VI,B(¢) 
VI,8(-~¢) = false, if VLB(¢ ) 
undefined, otherwise; 
true, if 12/,/3(¢) 
VI,B(~) A ~2) = false, if 12I,B(¢) 
undefined, otherwise; 
true, if VI,B (¢) 
~21,B(O V ~) = false, if ))I,B(¢) 
undefined, otherwise; 
true, 
~2I'B(~) ~ ~) = false, 
= false, 
= tr?~c, 
= V/ ,~(¢)  = t rue ,  
= false or FI ,B(¢)  = false, 
= true or ?)I,B(~) = true, 
= VI,B(9) = false, 
if Vt,B(¢) = true or ])I,B(¢) ¢ true, 
otherwise. 
Note that  ordinary sentences are given a thoroughly classical semantics. An 
ordinary sentence ~ is a (classical) tautology if and only if ~ is true in all propo- 
sitional interpretations. Note also that  complete interpretations are classical: they 
map each sentence on either true or false. 2 
Classical terminology and notation are extended in the obvious way: a proposi- 
tional interpretation (I, B) satisfies a sentence ¢ (denoted (I, B) ~ ~) iff FI,B(~/~) = 
true. In this case, (I,  B) is called a B-model (or simply a model) of ¢, and we say 
that  ~ is B-consistent. A set S of sentences entails a sentence ¢ (denoted S ~ ~) iff 
is true in every model of S. A set S of sentences B-entails a sentence ~ (denoted 
S ~B ~) iff ~b is true in every B-model of S. 
A propositional interpretation can be a model of a belief state is several ways. 
Definition 2.4. ( I ,B ' )  is an autoepistemic nterpretation of a belief state B iff 
B '  = B. (I, B ' )  is an autoepistemic model of B iff B '  = B and (I,  B ' )  ~ B +. If 
B has an autoepistemic model, we say that B is epistemicaUy consistent. 3 
Now we are ready to specify how the agent should derive his/her belief state 
from the set of premises. The following discussion will introduce and motivate the 
three-valued counterparts of stable expansions. In the following, let S and B denote 
the premises and the belief state of the agent, respectively. 
Essentially, the definition of stable expansions follows from the assumption that  
2The notion of propositional interpretation i troduced by Moore [27] corresponds toour notion 
of complete propositional interpretation. 
3These are the obvious extensions of Moore's notions. An anonymous referee pointed out that 
the definition of autoepistemic model is asymmetric: there is no negative counterpart ofcondition 
(I, B) ~ B +. The reason is that the sentences of B- are not necessarily true according to the 
agent's knowledge, but they may well be true in the real world. 
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the agent is ideally rational and introspective. In Moore's logic, rationality is for- 
malized by requiring a sentence ~ to be believed if and only if ~ is a logical con- 
sequence of the premises and introspective knowledge. In the three-valued case, 
doubts need to be taken into account. Doubts are caused by ambiguous premises, 
that, for some sentence ¢, suggest both that ~ should be believed and that 
should not be believed. Since the agent should make no arbitrary decision, his/her 
conclusions hould not be influenced by doubts. This form of independence will be 
expressed as follows. 
Principle 1. The agent should believe ¢ if ~ is a consequence of the premises 
and introspective knowledge, no matter how the agent's doubts can be removed. 
Principle 2. The agent should have no reason to believe ¢ if ¢ is not a con- 
sequence of the premises and introspective knowledge, no matter how the agent's 
doubts can be removed. 
To formalize the above principles, one should specify how the agent's doubts can 
possibly be removed. Equivalently, we will specify how B can be extended to a new 
belief state B t 2 B. Such admissible xtensions can be defined in several reasonable 
ways, which can be regarded as different assumptions on how the agent's knowledge 
may evolve along time. According to the easiest definition, one may state that B'  
is an admissible xtension of B whenever B ~ D B. Under this definition, a new 
piece of information that removes ome doubts might contradict S. 
Example 2.1. Let S = {-~p ~-- ~Lp, -,q ~ ~Lq,p V q}. S has two consistent sta- 
ble expansions that contain p and q (respectively) but not both. Therefore, S is 
ambiguous; p and q should be neither believed not disbelieved and hence p and q 
should be neither in B + nor in B - .  Thus, among the possible extensions of B, 
we have B'  = (B +, B -  U {p, q}), which, roughly speaking, corresponds to a hypo- 
thetical situation where ~Lp,-~Lq become true. Now, it is easy to see that S is 
B1-inconsistent (i.e., for all I : (I, B ~) ~: S. Consequently, if we regard B ~ as an ad- 
missible (or possible) extension of the agent's belief state, then we must implicitly 
accept hat a new piece of knowledge (in this case, ~Lp, ~Lq) that removes ome of 
the agent's doubts, might simultaneously contradict the premises. In this case (as a 
consequence of the second principle), no sentence can be disbelieved, because very 
sentence follows from the pemises and the new introspective knowledge. This is not 
unreasonable, for after detecting an inconsistency the agent should revise his/her 
beliefs (if possible) and hence, in general, one cannot say a priori which sentences 
will not be believed. However, the resulting logic is very weak: we have B-  ~ 0, 
which means that no nonmonotonic deduction is made. 4
According to another definition, B ~ can be an admissible xtension of B only if 
S is Bt-consistent, which reflects greater confidence in the premises, because it is 
implicitly assumed that doubts will be removed without contradicting S. Of course, 
this form of admissible xtension solves the problem illustrated by the previous 
example (it guarantees that B -  ~ 0). The formal definition is the following. 
4Several nonmonotonic logics have the same limitation. See the section on related work for 
more details. 
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Definition 2.5. The set of admissible xtensions of B (w.r.t. S) is 
As(B)  = {B' IB '  is a belief state, B' D B and S is B'-consistent}. 
Essentially, in this paper we will adopt this definition because it seems to provide 
the least inferential capabilities required to capture the semantics of disjunctiw~ 
programs. '5 Further notions of admissible xtensions are studied in [6, 8]. Finally. 
we need the following constraint. 
Principle S. The agent's belief state should be epistemically consistent. 
From a technical point of view, this constraint is needed to guarantee that the 
introspective knowledge of the agent exactly matches his/her belief state. However, 
the constraint can also be explained in terms of rationality and introspectiveness;: 
An ideally introspective agent knows that the real world is an interpretation of 
the form (I, B), where B is exactly his/her belief state. If no such interpretation 
satisfied the agent's beliefs (B+), then the agent would have no reason to trust 
his/her beliefs. Therefore, we require that for solne !, (I, B) ~ B +, which means 
that B should be epistemically consistent. 
The above principles are formalized by the following definition. 
Definition 2.6. Let S be a set of premises. A belief state B is a generalized stab& 
expansion (GSE) of S iff: 
1. S + = {¢  ) VB'  • As(B), S >B, 
2. B -  = I VB'  • As (B) ,  S >., ¢}. 
3. B is epistemically consistent. 
Every GSE is a possible belief state fbr our agent. GSE's enjoy a generalization of
Stalnaker's tability conditions, namely, the agent's beliefs are closed under logical 
consequence, and his/her introspective knowledge corresponds exactly to his/her 
belief state. 
Theorem 2.1 (Stability). If B is a generalized stable expansion, then B is stab&, 
that is: 
(i) If B + ~ ~b, then o • B +. 
(ii) LOcB+ iff ~o • B +. 
(iii) ~L~b • B + iff ~ • B - .  
GSE's can also be expressed in terms of a transformation over belief states. 
Definition 2.7. Operator Os = (Os(B)+,~Is(B) -  is defined by the following 
5In fact, the stationary schemata that  will be employed to capture the stat ionary semant ics may 
easily cause the problem i l lustrated by the previous example. On the contrary, when we restrict to 
the  autoepistemic translat ions of normal programs, the two forms of admissible xtension coincide 
(such trans lat ions are B' -consistent  for all B~). Indeed, in [7], the first formulat ion was adopted. 
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equations: 
es(B)  + = {¢ f VB' • As(B), S ¢}, 
Os(B)-  = {¢ [VB' • As(B) ,S ¢}. 
From Definitions 2.6 and 2.7, it follows immediately that the GSE's o /S  are the 
epistemically consistent fixed points of 0s .  The operator is monotonic. 
Lemma 2.1 (Monotonicity). B1 C_ B2 implies Os(B1) C Os(B2). 
Therefore, by Tarski's theorem, Os has a least fixed point, equal to (Os T a), 
for some ordinal a. Obviously, if the least fixed point is epistemically consistent, 
then it is the least GSE of S. We will see that the least fixed point may not be 
epistemically consistent, because, premises may have more than one minimal GSE 
or no GSE at all. 
2. 2. Relations with Moore's Logic 
Stable expansions can be considered as a special case of GSE's. 
Theorem 2.2. T is a consistent stable expansion of S iff (T, T) is a complete GSE 
o/S.  
In other words, consistent stable expansions and complete GSE's are in one-to- 
one correspondence. On the contrary, incomplete GSE's may not correspond to 
any stable expansion (see next example). Moore's logic can be captured by means 
of the simple axiom schema 
(CA) L¢ V - ,L¢ 
in the sense that the consistent stable expansions of S and the GSE's of S t2 CA 
are in one-to-one correspondence. 
Theorem 2.3. If  T is a consistent stable expansion of S, then (T,T) is a GSE of 
S U CA. Conversely, if B is a GSE of S U CA, then B + is a consistent stable 
expansion of S and B-  = -B+. 
Intuitively, CA force the agent to have no doubts, and hence eliminates all in- 
complete GSE's; the remaining GSE's correspond to stable expansions by Theorem 
2.2 
Theorems 2.3, 2.2, and 2.1 show that the three-valued logic is a natural gen- 
eralization of Moore's logic. Theorem 2.2 proves also that the three-valued logic 
is at least as "robust" as Moore's logic, in the sense that a set of premises has a 
consistent stable expansion only if it has a GSE. The converse is not true. 
Example 2.2. Let S = {p, q ~-- -~Lq}. S has no stable expansion, but it has a GSE 
B, such that p E B +, q ¢ B +, and q ¢ B - .  In other words, the agent believes p 
and is doubtful about q. 
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An immediate consequence of Theorem 2.3 is that some premises have many 
minimal GSE's and some have no GSE's. In order to obtain some interesting 
results on the existence of GSE's and least GSE's we have to restrict our attention 
to a specific class of premises. 
2.3. Implicative Premises 
Definition 2.8. A sentence ~ is implicative if y) is ordinary, or ~ = (~1 +--- ~92), where 
~1 is an ordinary sentence, ~u is subjective, and *-- does not occur in ~2. A set 
of sentences i implicative if it contains only implicative sentences. 
For example, p v -~q +-- ~Lr  A Ls is implicative, while CA is not. Implicative 
premises are important per se, because they are expressive and enjoy a number 
of nice properties. In this paper, however, they are relevant mainly because they 
capture the common features of all the autoepistenfic translations of logic programs. 
For implicative premises we have a strong result: 
Theorem 2.~. Let S be an implicative set of sentences and let B = 1.fp((-)s). Then 
the following are equivalent: 
(i) S has a CSE.  
(ii) B + is consistent. 
(iii) B is the least GSE of S. 
The above theorem can be rephrased by borrowing terminology from logic program- 
ruing: implicative premises have a fixed-point semantics, which corresponds to the 
declarative semantics provided by their least GSE. However, unlike logic programs, 
imphcative theories are expressive nough to be inconsistent, i.e., without GSE's. 
Implicative theories can be understood in terms of classical ogic. Define: 
Heads(S) = {~1 (~- -~)  E S}UOrd(S) ,  
Act ive(S,B)  = {(~-a)  l (~)cSand I : sa}uOrd(S) ,  
Cons(S ,B)  = Heads(Act ive(S,B)  ). 
For example, if S = {p, (q ~ Lr A ~Ls), (a ~- ~Lb)} and B = ({r}, {s}}, then 
 eads(S) = {p, q, at, 
Active(S, B) = {p, q ~ Lr A ~Ls}, 
Cons(S, B) : {p, q}. 
Note that ordinary sentences are considered as the conclusions of implications 
whose body is always true. Cons(S, B) is a set of ordinary sentences; it captures the 
ordinary B-consequences of S, as it is shown by point iv of the next lemma. Most of 
the other facts that are proved in the lemma are needed for technical reasons. The 
reader may focus attention on points (v) and (vi), which show how the ordinary 
part of Os can be derived by means of classical ogic. 
Lemma 2.2 (Elementary properties of implicative theories). I f  S is ark impi:icative 
set of sentences and ~ is an ordinary sentence, then: 
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(vii) 
(viii) 
(i) B C B' implies Cons(S, B) C Cons(S, B'). 
(ii) (I, B) ~ S iff I ~ Cons(S, B). 
(iii) B '  E .As(B) iff B' D B and Cons(S,B') is consistent. 
(iv) s ~B ~ iff Cons(S, B) ~ ~. 
(v) ~ ~ Os(B) + iff Cons(S, B) ~ ~ 
(vi) 7) E (~s(B)- iff for all B' D t3, either Cons(S, B') is inconsistent or Cons(S, 
S') y-~o. 
Moreover, if B is a fixed point of @s : 
~ B + iff Cons(S, B) ~- ~. 
E B -  ifffor all B' D_ B, either Cons(S, B') y-~ or Cons(S, B') is inconsistent. 
Finally, we introduce a subclass of implicative premises which is characterized 
by a generalization of an important property of logic programs: 
Definition 2.9. An implicative set of sentences S is a quasiprogram iff Heads(S) is 
(classically) consistent. 
This property allows us to improve Theorem 2.4. 
Theorem 2.5. If S is a quasiprogram, then lf p( O s ) is the least G S E of S. 
We will see that many of the autoepistemic translations of logic programs are 
quasiprograms. 
3. LOGIC  PROGRAMS 
A normal program is a set of rules having the form 
A ~-- A1, . . . ,  An, ~A,~+I, . . . ,  ~Am, 
where A, A1, . . . ,  Am are atoms. A disjunctive program is a set of rules having the 
form 
A1 V ... V Ak ~-- Ak+I , . . . ,A ,~,~A~+I , . . . ,~Am.  
In this paper we restrict our attention to (possibly infinite) propositional pro- 
grams. This assumption is not really restrictive. In fact, all the semantics dealt 
with in this paper give each program P and its ground instantiation P '  the same 
meaning, and P '  can be translated into a propositional theory by uniformly trans- 
lating ground atoms into propositional symbols. 
Therefore, assume a fixed propositional language £ and denote with 7-/the set 
of atoms (or propositional symbols) of £. 7-/is usually called Herbrand base and is 
only required to be a countable set. The following abbreviations will be needed: 
-x  = ~/x ,  
Atom(X) = ?-t n X. 
Atom (.) will be extended to belief states in the obvious way. Lit(X) will de- 
note the set of literals of X. Also Lit(.) will be extended to belief states in the 
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obvious way. The notion of Herbrand base has to be generalized in order to fit the 
expressiveness of disjunctive programs. 
Definition 3.1. The conjunctive Herbrand base [2], denoted CHB, is the set of all 
nonredundant conjunctions of ordinary atoms. 
The disjunctive Herbrand base [2], denoted DHB, is the set of all nonredundant 
disjunctions of ordinary atoms. 
We will need a uniform way" to represent different semmltics for logic programs 
in order to facilitate their comparison. 
Definition 3.2. A semantics i a partial function from the set of normal programs 
into belief states. 
Therefore, if SEM is a semantics and SEM(P) is defined, then SEM(P) is a pair 
of sets of sentences, that will be denoted 
(SEM(P) +, SEM(P)-}.  
In the semantics proposed so far, SEM(P)  + is the set of true sentences, while 
SEM(P)  is the set of false sentences. This naturally leads to the following: defi- 
nition. 
Definition 3.3. We say that a semantics SEM is consistent if, when SEM(P) is de- 
fined, there is a model of SEM(P)  + that falsifies all the sentences of SEM IP)-. 
4. THE SEMANTICS  OF NORMAL PROGRAMS 
In this section, let the metavariable P range over normal programs. 
4.1. Autoepistemic Semantics 
The relations between logic programming and autoepistemic logics were explored 
for the first time by Gelfond [14]. He defined an autoepistemic semantics for logic 
programs by the following method: 
• Each program P is translated into a set of autoepistenfic sentences P~I- 
• If P~I, has a unique stable expansion T, then the atomic part of T provides 
the canonical model of P. 
More specifically, Gelfond adopted the following translation. 
Definition 4.1 (Autoepistemic translation P~I [14]). Phi is obtained by translating 
each rule A *-- A1, . . . ,A ,> ~A,~+I, . . . ,~A, , .  of P into 
A ~- A1 A ... /\ An A ~LA~+I A ... A -,LAIn. 
In this section, Gelfond's method will be extended to the three-valued autoepis- 
temic logic and to other translations, in order to capture some of the major se- 
mantics of normal programs in one scheme. For each semantics, we will recall its 
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definition and show its relations with the three-valued autoepistemic logic. Finally, 
a new semantics, induced by the unifying schema, will be briefly discussed. 
4.2. Stable Semantics 
In [16], Gelfond's autoepistemic semantics has been entirely rephrased in terms of 
logic programming concepts. This led to the notion of stable model. 
Definition 4.2 (Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, rip, stable models [16]). Let P 
be a normal program and I be a Herbrand interpretation. The Gelfond-Lifschitz 
transformation of P with respect o I is the normal program pI ,  obtained from 
P by: 
1. Eliminating every clause whose body contains a negative literal HA, where 
AEI ,  
2. Deleting all negative literals from the body of the remaining clauses. 
Denote by lm(P I) the least model of pI and define 
l ip( I )  = Im(PI). 
An Herbrand interpretation I is a stable model of a normal program P iff I is a 
fixed point of HR. 




= ~ (I, - I} ,  if I is the only stable model of P, 
[ undefined, otherwise; 
N{(Z,-i) I Z is a stable model of P}, 
= if P has a stable model, 
undefined, otherwise. 
The next lemma shows the similarity between the operator l ip used in the defi- 
nition of stable models and Op~. 
Lemma 4.1. For all complete belief states B, 
IIp(Atom(B+)) = Atom(Op~ 1 (B)+). 
The stable models of P are in one-to-one correspondence with the complete 
GSE's of P~I- 
Theorem 4.1. I is a stable model of P if and only if I = Atom(B+), where B is a 
complete GSE of P~I. 
PaooF.  It is well known that I is a stable model of P iff I = Atom(T), where T is 
a stable expansion of P~I (see [16]). By Theorem 2.2, T is a stable expansion of P~I 
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iff (T,T) is a complete GSE of P~I. The Theorem follows by letting B = (T. T). 
[] 
As an immediate corollary, the two stable semantics can be expressed in terms 




= ~ Atom(B) ,  if B is the only complete GSE of' P,1. 
[ undef ined,  otherwise; 
N{Atom(B)  I B is a corr~plete GSE of  P~},  
= if P~I has a complete GSE, 
undef ined,  otherwise. 
~.3. Well-Founded Semantics 
In the last subsection we have proved that the complete (and hence maximal) GSE's 
of P~I correspond to the stable models of P. This raises two natural questions: Is 
there a least GSE of P~I? Which is the corresponding semantics for logic programs? 
The answer to the first question is yes. 
.Proposition 4.1. l fp( (gp~) is the least GSE of P~I. 
PROOF. P~I is equivalent to a quasiprogram, obtained by replacing each rule 
A ~ A1 A . . .  A A~ A =LA~+~ A .. .  A =LA.~ 
with the equivalent implicative rule 
(A ~ A1 A . .. A A,~) ~ -~LA,.+I A .. . A =LA,~. 
It follows easily, by Theorem 2.5, that l fp((~p, l)  is the least GSE of -P>I- [~ 
The second question will be answered by showing that the least GSE of P~I 
corresponds to the well-founded semantics of P. 
The well-founded semantics has been introduced in [39] and has been reformu- 
lated many times ([28, 40, 37], etc.). None of these formulations will be illustrated 
here. We prefer to characterize the well-founded semantics as the least fixed point 
of an operator ~e derived from FIR, because this formulation will make the proof of 
the correspondence theorem much simpler. The proof that the definition presented 
here is equivalent to the original one can be found in Appendix B. 
Definition 4.4. For all Herbrand belief states B define 
• p(B)  = (1 - Ip ( -B - ) , -Hp(B+)) .  
The well-founded semantics of P (denoted by WF(P) )  is the least fixed point 
of q'p. 
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The interested reader may easily verify that the fixed points of ~p correspond 
to the three-valued stable models of P [30]. ~Ilp is the exact counterpart of @p,~. 
Lemma 4.2. For all belief states B, q~p(Atom(B)) = Atom(~P, l (B)) .  
Lemma 4.2 provides a representation f @P~l in terms of [IF, i.e., in terms of 
logic programming notions. As an immediate consequence of Lemma 4.2 and of the 
monotonicity of OR,1 (Lemma 2.1), we have that ~p is monotonic, too. 
Lemma 4.3. For all Herbrand belief states B1,B2, B1 c B2 implies ~p(B1) C_ 
~I/p (B2). 
Thus, by Tarski's theorem, Ifp(ff2p) always exists and equals lI]p ~" Oz, for some 
ordinal a. Now we are ready to prove that the least GSE of P~I corresponds to the 
well-founded semantics. 
Theorem 4.2. WF(P)  = Atom(B),  where B is the least GSE of Phi. 
PROOF. As a consequence of Tarski's theorem, there exists an ordinal a such that 
WF(P)  = ~p T a and B = Op>l T a. Moreover, for a l l3 ,  we have k~p T 3 = 
Atom((gp~ T 3) (it follows from Lemma 4.2, through an easy induction on 3). 
Conclude that WF(P)  = ~p T a = Atom(Opt, T a) = Atom(B).  [] 
4.4. Supported Models 
Apt, Blair, and Walker [1] introduced the following notion. 
Definition 4.5. A Herbrand interpretation I is a supported model of P iff for all 
a E I, there exists a rule a *-- ¢ in P such that I ~ ¢. 
The correspondence b tween supported models and autoepistemic logic was in- 
vestigated by Marek and Subrahmanian [24]. It was observed in [25] that their 
result can be restated in terms of the following translation. 
Definition 4.5 (Autoepistemic translation P>~). P>2 is obtained by translating 
each rule A +-- A1, . . . ,  An, ~An+l , . . . ,  ~Am of P into 
A ~ LA1 A ... ALAn A ~LAn+I A .. .  A -,LAIn. 
Theorem 4.3 ([24, 25]). I is a supported model of P iff I = Atom(T),  where T is 
a stable expansion of P>2. 
From this theorem and Theorem 2.2 we immediately get the relations between 
supported models and three-valued autoepistemic logics: 
Theorem 4.4. I is a supported model of P iff I = Atom(B+),  where B is a com- 
plete GSE of P~2. 
Note the analogy between this result and Theorem 4.1. The interested reader 
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may verify that Op,2 is similar to the immediate-consequences operator Tp, that 
is, for all complete belief states B, 
Tp(Ato,n(B+)) = Atom(~)p,~ (/3)) +. 
In the rest of the paper, we will need the following semantics, based on supported 
models: 
{ ~{{I , - I} l I  ,is a supported model of P}, SUPP(P)  = if P has at supported model, 
"undefined, otherwise. 
4.5. Fitting's Semantics 
Note that P~2 is a quasiprogram and, therefore, by Theorem 2.5, it always has one 
minimal GSE. We are going to investigate the semantics induced by such GSE; 
it will turn out to be very similar to the Kripke-Kleene semantics introduced by 
Fitting [13]. 
Fitting's semantics is captured by the least fixed point of a suitable operator, 
denoted by ~p. Fitting's definition employs annotated sentences. For the sake of 
simplicity, the essentially equivalent definition proposed by Kunen is adopted here: 
Definition 4.7 ([19]). For all Herbrand belief states/3 define 
d)p(/3) + = {A I for some clause 
(A *- A1,..- ,A,~,~A~+I . . . .  ,~A,~) in P 
A1,...,A,~ E B + and A~+I . . . . .  A~ C B }, 
• p (B) -  = {A I for all clauses 
(A ~ A1,...,A,~, ~An+l , . . . ,  ~A,~) in P 
there is an atom A,, such that either 
i<_nandAi~/3 -  or i>nandA~B +}. 
Fitting 's semantics is F IT (P )  = lfp(q~p). 
The following result proves that. the le~t GSE of P~2 is closely related to Fitting's 
semantics. 
Th.eorem 4.5. Let P be any program and let P' be the program obtained from P by 
eliminating all the clauses that contain a pair of complementary literals in the 
body. Finally, let B be the least GSE of P,2. Then 
Atom(/3) = F IT(P ' ) .  
Intuitively, the semantics induced by P~2 ignores all the clauses of the form 
A ~ ...A~ . . . .  A i ' "  
because their body can never be satisfied. 
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Example 4.1. Let P = {(P ~-- q, ,-~q), (q +-- ~q)}. In F IT (P ) ,  p is undefined 
because both q and ~q are undefined. On the contrary, p is false in the semantics 
induced by P~2, because the first rule of P is ignored. According to this semantics, 
P is equivalent to {q *- ~q}. 
If no rule contains a pair of complementary literals in its body, then Fitting's 
semantics corresponds exactly to the least GSE of P~2. The semantics induced by 
P~2 does not correspond to any known semantics; however, the possibility of making 
inferences, like deducing ~p from the program P of Example 1, is considered as a 
desirable property. 
Fitting's semantics is not exactly captured by P~2 because, for every atom A, 
the translations of A and ~A are mutually inconsistent. This can be avoided in 
several ways by exploiting the intensional nature of the belief operator L. Here we 
adopt the following translation. 
Definition 4.8 (Autoepistemic translation P~a)- P~3 is obtained by translating 
each rule A *-- A1,. . .  ,An, wAn+l , . . . ,  "JAm of P into 
A .--- LLA1 A • • • ALLAn A L-'LAn+I A • .. A L-~LAm. 
This translation maps A and ~A, respectively, into LLA and L~LA,  which are 
mutually consistent. As a result, we get the desired correspondence b tween ~p 
and Op~3. 
Lemma 4.~. For all B, q~p(Atom(B)) = Atom(@2.~(B)). 
Note that (I)p corresponds to two applications of Op~ a ; this is due to the nesting 
of the modal operator in P~3. From Lemma 4.4, it follows that Fitting's semantics 
is the atomic part of the least GSE of P~3. 
Theorem 4.6. F IT (P )  = Atom(B) ,  where B is the least GSE of Op~3. 
Proof (Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2). As a consequence of Tarski's the- 
orem, there exists an ordinal a such that F IT (P )  = (I)p T ~ and B = Op~.~ T a = 
@~ T a. Moreover, for all/3, we have Cp T 13 = Atom(O~p~ T 13) (it follows from 
Lemma 4.4, through an easy induction on ¢~). Conclude that F IT (P )  = ¢p  T a = 
Atom(O2p~ T a) = Atom(B).  [] 
We are left to talk about the semantics induced by the complete GSE's of P~3. 
They correspond to supported models. In fact, as the interested reader may easily 
verify, the stable expansions of P~3 coincide with the stable expansions of F~2, since 
their rules are equivalent in every stable set. As a consequence, also the complete 
GSE's of P~3 and P~2 coincide. By Theorem 4.4, they all correspond to supported 
models. 
4.6. Kunen's Semantics 
Kunen's semantics can be obtained by truncating the inductive construction of 
Fitting's semantics after w steps [19]. 
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Definition 4.9. KUN(P)  = C~p T Od. 
It follows easily from Lemma 4.4 that ~p T aJ = Atorn(Op~ ~ w). 
derive the following theorem. 
Theorem ~. 7. For all normal programs P, 
KUN(P) = Atom((gp~ Tw). 
Thus we 
Therefore, Kunen's semantics can be expressed in terms of the autoepistemic 
operator Op~. When ~Sp is continuous (e.g., when P has a finite Herbrand base) 
KUN(P)  = FIT(P).  Thus we get the following theorem. 
Theorem ~.8. If q~r' is continuous, then 
KUN(P) = Atom(B), 
where B is the least GSE of P~3. 
5. THE SEMANTICS  OF D IS JUNCTIVE  PROGRAMS 
In this section, P will range over disjunctive programs. Among the first extensions 
of the well-founded semantics to disjunctive programs we find the strong, weak, 
and optimal well-founded semantics for disjunctive programs introduced by Ross 
[35]. Other major approaches are the stationary semantics [29], the generalized 
well-fbunded semantics for disjunctive programs (GDWFS) [2], and its ext(msion 
WF 3 [31. 
The three well-founded semantics by Ross and the stationary semantics are con- 
sistent, in the sense of Definition 3.3. On the contrary, GDWFS and WF 3 have 
recently been shown to map some programs onto inconsistent belief states [11]. 
Consistency is an important property for the aforementioned semantics, because 
the sentences of SEM(P) -  are assumed to be false on the basis of nonmonotonic 
inferences. We say that these semantics are based on a notion of negation-as- 
assumed-falsity. 
In Section 5.2 some interesting nonconsistent semantics (based on a different 
notion of negation) will be introduced. However, first we will focus our attention 
on the stationary semantics and show how it can be captured by the three-valued 
autoepistemic logic. 
5.1. The Stationary Semantics 
The stationary semantics is essentially based on the extended closed world assump- 
tion ( ECWA). Define 
ECWA(S) = {~ I ~ is true in all the minimal models of S}. 
In order to define the stationary semantics, the language has to be extended with 
a set of new atoms, 7-if, such that; 
• ~n~'  = O. 
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• For each atom p in 7-/there exists a dist inct atom Bp in 7/'. 
For all disjunctive programs P (built from the atoms of 7-l) define a new program 
P~B by t rans lat ing each negative l iteral ~a  into ~Ba.  Then define the following 
sequence: 
S0 = {~, 
Sa+l = {Bpl  V ' "  V Bpn IP] V ' "  Vpn E ECWA(P~BUSa)}  
U{-~Bpl V ' "  V -~Bp~ I -~Pl V ' "  V ~Pn C ECWA(P~B U S~)}, 
S~ = U S~, 
c~<A 
where A ranges over l imit ordinals. The sequence is monotonic and reaches a l imit 
at some ordinal  5, that  is, for all (~ > 5, S~ = $6. 6 $5 is called the stationary state 
of P .  The stat ionary  state is the basis of the stationary semantics. 
Definition 5.1 ([29]). 
STN(P)  + = {p lV ' "VPn  I Bp lV ' "VBpnES~},  
STN(P) -  = {Pl A " " A Pn I ~Bpl  A ""  A ~Bpn c S~}, 
where S5 is the stat ionary  state of P.  
In order to express the stat ionary semantics through three-valued autoepistemic 
logic, it suffices to add to P~s the following axiom schemata, that  we call stationary 
schemata: 
-~Pl V . . .  V -~Pn *-- -~L(pl A . . .  A pn), 
Bp l  V . . .  V Bpn +--- L(pl V ' "  V pn), 
~Bp l  V . . .  V ~Bpn +-- L(~pl  V . . .  V-~pn). 
Intuitively, the first schema corresponds to the ECWA for conjunct ions (i.e., 
each conjunct ion that  is not derivable should be assumed to be false), while the 
other schemata transform the atoms of 7-I into the corresponding atoms of 7-/', as 
it happens when S~+1 is generated from S~. 
In the following, the set of instances of the stat ionary schemata will be denoted 
by SA. 
The reader will not be surprised to see that  the least GSE of P~BU SA corre- 
sponds to the stat ionary  semantics. In the following, let DC(B)  be an abbreviat ion 
for 
{B + N DHB,  B -  n CHB) .  
6The original definition [29] is based on GCWA [261 rather than ECWA. However, in some 
cases, the original definition does not exactly match some properties and examples tated in 
[29] (e.g., the above sequence may not be monotonic; these facts have already been noted by 
Przymusinski (personal communication)). All these properties and examples are matched when 
ECWA is adopted, so we believe that Przymusinski's intention was to use ECWA. Accordingly, I 
adopted this definition here. 
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Theorem 5.1. Let P be a disjunctive program, and let B = l fp 
(e.~,,~SA). 
(i) B is the least GSE of P~B 0 SA. 
(ii) STN(P)  : DC(B). 
5.2. Epistemic Semantics and Pure Negation-as-Failure 
In this section we introduce some interesting semantics which are inconsistent in 
the sense of Definition 3. The basic idea is that the autoepistemic translations 
of normal programs can immediately be extended to disjunctive programs. For 
example, if P = {a V b *-- p, ~q}, then 
P~I = {a V b e-- i) A ~Lq}, 
P~2 = {aVb+- -LpA~Lq},  
P~3 = {a V b ~- LLp A L~Lq}. 
Thus each of the semantics for normal programs captured by the autoepistemic 
framework has a natural disjunctive counterpart, based on the same autoepistemic 
translation and on the same class of GSE's. 
Definition 5.2. Epistemic semantics. For all disjunctive programs P define 
DC(B), if B is the only complete GSE of P~1, 
ST!DIs(P) = undefined, otherwise; 
{ O{DC(B) [ B is a complete GSE of P~}, 
STIDIs(P) = if P~ has a complete GSE, 
undefined, otherwise; 
WFDIs(P) = DC(BF~,), where Bp,~ is the least GSE of P~; 
FITDIs(P) = DC(Bp~), where Bp~.:, is the least GSE of P~3; 
_T(UNDIs(P ) = DC(Op~:~ Tw). 
Note the analogy with Corollary 4.1 and with Theorems 4.2, 4.6, and 4.7. Note 
also that P~I and P~a are quasiprograms and, hence, by Theorem 2.5, lfp((gp~l) 
and lfp(Opz~,~) are the least GSE's of P~I and P~a, respectively. Therefore, WFDzs 
and FITDIs are always defined and enjoy a fixed-point semantics given by the 
ordinal sequences (Op~l T 0), (Op~l T 1), . . .  and (Og~:~ T 0), (Op,~ ~ 1) . . . . .  
The following example shows that none of the epistemic semantics is consistent. 
Example 5.1. Let P = {p V q}. Note that P~I = P>3 = P. P and its translations 
have one GSE, denoted by B, which corresponds to the unique stable expansion of 
P, that is, B = (E(P), E(P)) .  7 Obviously, p V q E B +, while p, q C B ; therefore, 
B is inconsistent. 
7E(-) maps each set of ordinary sentences into its unique stable expansion which is defined m 
I231. 
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Inconsistency is not a problem because--according to the epistemic semantics--  
HA should be read as "A is not derivable" or "A is not believed" rather than "A 
is false." We call this form of negation pure negation-as-failure. It is easy to see 
that the epistemic semantics are different from the semantics based on negation- 
as-assumed-falsity. 
Example 5.2. Let P and B be defined as in Example 5.1 and let SEM range 
over the various well-founded semantics by Ross and over the stationary semantics, 
GDWFS, and WF 3. SEM(P) is consistent and p,q ~ SEM(P)- .  It follows 
immediately that SEM(P) ~ B, i.e, SEM is different from all the epistemic 
semantics. 
For the program illustrated in the above examples, the epistemic semantics are 
strictly stronger than the other semantics. However, in general, the semantics 
belonging to the two classes are not comparable. 
Example 5.3. Let P = {(a ~-- ~p, ~q), (p V q)}. According to the epistemic se- 
mantics, a can be derived from P, because neither p nor q can be derived and hence 
~--p and ~q both follow from P. 
On the contrary, according to the other semantics (excepting the weak well- 
founded semantics), a is false (i.e., a E SEM(P)-)  because the body of the cor- 
responding rule is inconsistent with p V q. According to the weak well-founded 
semantics, instead, a is undefined. 
FITDIS and KUNDIs seem to be of little interest because their inferences are 
extremely weak: rules can never derive new facts from any disjunction. 
Example 5.4. Let P = {(a +-- p), (a +-- q), (p V q)}. One would expect a to be 
derivable from this program. However, a is not believed in the least GSE of P~3. 
More specifically, we have P~3 = {(a +-- LLp), (a +-- nLq), (p V q)}. Neither p nor q 
are derivable and hence LLp and LLq are false. It follows that a c FITDIs(P)-. 
The same is true of KUNDIs, because, in this case, KUNms(P)  = FITms(P).  
For this reason, F ITms and KUNDIs will not be further discussed. We will 
focus our attention on the other epistemic semantics. The following examples illus- 
trate these semantics and show that the main characteristics of WF, ST!, and ST, 
as well as their mutual relations, are preserved by their disjunctive counterparts. 
Example 5.5. Let P be the following normal program: 
Then we have 
a ~ ~b~ 
p*- -b .  
ST!(P) = ST(P) 
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= ({b ,p} ,{a , r}} ,  
WF(P)  = (0,0). 
Note the peculiar conclusions of ST! and oCT, that cannot be reached through 
WF.  Now consider the disjunctive program P' ,  obtained from P by replacing p 
with Pl V [2, that  is, 
Pl V p2 ~- b. 
ST!D Is (P ' ) ,STDIs (P ' ) ,  and WFDzs(P') are similar to STt(P),ST(P), and 
WF(P) ,  respectively. We have 
ST!DIs (P )  = STDIs (P )  
= (llb, p~ vp '~ l l , l~ , , , r , , ,pe l ) ,  
WF(P)  = (~),jpl.pg]}, 
where I[dx,..., G[I is the set of nonredundant disjunctions of atoms that contain 
some d~ and jc~,...,c,~l is the set of nonredundant conjunctions of atoms that 
contain some ci. 
Pl and P2 have no counterpart in P. They are disbelieved because there is no 
way to derive them- -a t  most, ill some generalized stable expansions, it is possible 
to believe Pl V P2. 
EzarnpIe 5.6. Let P be the following normal program: 
~l.'hen we have 
t) *-- (~ ,
F < b. 
OCT!(P) ~mdcfi~wd, 
ST(P) = ({, -},0! ,  
WF(P)  = (~,o) .  
Note that  r can be concluded by means of OCT, but not by means of the other 
semantics. This is a typical nonconstructiw~ inference of ST,  called flo,.ti,~g ¢:cm- 
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clusion. Now consider the disjunctive program P' ,  obtained from P by replacing p
with Pl V P2, that is, 
a ~ t~,Fb, 
Pl Vp2 e- a, 
r ~-- Pl, 
r e- P2, 
r +---- b. 
ST!DIs(P') and WFDIs(P') are similar to ST!(P) and WF(P) respectively. In 
fact, 
ST!DIS(P') = undefined, 
WFDIs(P') = ((~, [Pl,P2I)- 
Also STDIs(P r) and ST(P) are similar, although their comparison is slightly 
less obvious. We have 
STDIs(P') = (llr, (a V b), (Pl Vp2 V b)ll, [Pl,P2[). 
Note that all the disjunctions in STDIS(P') + are either explicitly or implicitly 
true in ST(P). 
• r is both in STD~s(P') + and ST(P) +. 
• a V b is true in all the stable models of P. 
• PI V P2 V b corresponds to p V b, which is true in all the stable models of P. 
Strange as they may seem, the semantics based on pure negation-as-failure prove 
to be indispensable for a large class of applications, where certain inferences have 
to be triggered by partial lack of knowledge. The following are two examples of 
such applications. 
Example 5.7. A doctor knows that his patient is affected either by disease dl or by 
disease d2. If the doctor knows which disease is affecting the patient, then she/he 
can apply a specific therapy. If the doctor does not know which disease is affecting 
the patient, then she/he should infer that more clinical tests are needed, because 
prescribing the wrong treatment may be dangerous for the patient. 
This example can be formalized by the following program, where tl, t2 represent 
the therapies for dl and d2, respectively, and ta represents the need for clinical 
tests: 
P = {(tl +-- -  dl), (t2 +-- d2), (t3 ~-- ~da, ~d2)}. 
If an epistemic semantics is adopted, then P is a correct formalization of the ex- 
ample, in the following sense: 
• tl E SEM(P  U {dl}) + and t2,t3 E SEM(P  U {dl})- .  
• t2 c SEM(P  U {d2}) + and tl, t3 C SEM(P  U {d2})-. 
• t3 E SEM(PU {dl V d2}) + and tl,t2 E SEM(PU {dl V d2})-. 
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P is correct also in a more general sense: tl,t2, and, most of all, t3 have their 
intended meaning not only in P O {dr}, P U {d2}, and P U {d~ V d2}, but also in 
every program PUEDB,  where EDB is a set of positive clauses that do not contain 
t ] ,  t2, t3. 
Example 5.8. Consider a census database DB such that, for all persons x, male(x)V 
fiemale(x) is a logical consequence of DB. At the time of the creation of DB, the 
data of some persons may be partially unavailable; for example, the sex of some 
individual x may not be known. In order to collect the missing information, it may 
be helpflfl to make a list of all the persons whose data are not complete. For this 
purpose one should define a relation r such that r(x) is inferred from DB if and 
only if neither male(x) nor female(x) can be derived from DB. 
Note the similarity between this example and the problem of finding r~.7xll valises 
of a certain kind, namely, values which are only partially specified by a finite range 
of possible values, which can be represented by a disjunction like 'g,('ul) V. . .  v t,',('t,~) 
(see Reiter [34]). 
Under the epistemic semantics, the relation r can be defined by the simple pro- 
gram 
P = { , ' (x )  ~-- ~male(x ) ,  ~.t'e~,~ale(:~) }.8 
If some form of negation-as-assumed-falsity is adopted, then the formalizations 
illustrated in the previous examples are not correct: t3 turns out to be false in 
PU{dlVd2}; similarly, r(x) is false when the database contains male(.z)Vfcmale(~). 
Indeed, negation-as-assumed-falsity makes it extremely hard to define relations like 
t:3 and r, as the reader may easily verify. In oder to give a formal explanation of 
this fact, we will define a class of relations called i97~or'ance t sts--bv abstracting 
the common features of ta and r'. 
5.3. I9'n.or'ar~ce Tests 
First we recall the standard notions of extensional and intensional databases. ]Let 
".~ be partit ioned in two sets: the set of exte~sior~.o.l atoms and the set of i~.ter~.sional 
rztoms. An eztensional database is a set of facts of the form 
AI V . . .  V A~. 
where the A~'s are extensional atoms. An mte'asio~ml database is a set of rules of 
the form 
A1 V ... V Ak *- AI:+I,..., A~, ~A,~+I,... ,  A~, 
where A1 .-. Ak are intensional atoms. 
Now we are ready to define ignorance tests. For tile sake of simplicity, we give 
tile definition only for total semantics. 
8Of course, both r and t3 (from the previous example) can be easily defined with any language 
that contains a belief operator L (e.g., Gelfond's epistemic specifications [15] and Przymusinski 's 
epistemic logic [33]) by replacing ~ with ~L. 
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Definition 5.3. Let p, q be extensional atoms. An ignorance test for p, q is a triple 
(P, r, SEM) ,  where P is a disjunctive program, r is an intensional atom, and 
SEM is a total semantics, and such that for all extensional databases EDB,  
r E SEM(P  U EDB)  + iff EDB/ -p  and EDB ~q. 
Ignorance tests generalize the essential features of Examples 5.7 and 5.8. In the 
former, (P, t3, SEM)  is an ignorance test for dl and d2, provided that SEM is an 
epistemic semantics. Under the same condition, in Example 5.8, (P, r(t), SEM} is 
an ignorance test for male(t) and female(t), for all ground terms t. 
Ignorance tests are difficult to define by means of negation-as-falsity, because 
the former are inherently nonmonotonic, as it is shown by the following lemma. 
Lemma 5.1. Let p, q be extensional atoms, let SEM be a total semantics, and let P 
be a disjunctive program. If there exists an extensional database EDB such that: 
EDB ~-p and EDB I-q, and 
either SEM(P  U EDB)  c_ SEM(P  U EDB U {p}) or SEM(P  UEDB)  c_ 
SEM(P  U EDB U {q}), 
then, for all intensional atoms r, (P, r, SEM)  is not an ignorance test for p, q. 
PROOF. Straightforward from the definition of ignorance tests. [] 
On the contrary, the known forms of negation-as-assumed-falsity exhibit a mono- 
tonic behavior in a large number of cases. Consider the weak well-founded seman- 
tics, for example: 
Lemma 5. 2. Let SEM be the weak well-founded semantics for disjunctive programs 
and let p, q be distinct atoms. Then, for all P, 
SEM(P  U {p V q}) C_ SEM(P  U {p V q} U {p}). 
The above two lemmas imply that, by means of the weak well-founded semantics, 
it is impossible to define any ignorance test. This is formalized by the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 5.2. Let SEM be the weak well-founded semantics. For all P, r, and SEM,  
and for all distinct extensional atoms p and q, (P, r, SEM} is not an ignorance 
test for p and q. 
PROOF.  Straightforward f rom Lemmas 5.2 and 5.1. [] 
The strong well-founded semantics uffers from similar problems. It is always 
possible to extend any EDB in a way that causes the well-founded semantics to 
behave monotonically. This fact is formalized by the next lemma. 
Lemma 5.3. Let SEM be the strong well-founded semantics, let P be a disjunctive 
program, and let p, q, c be distinct atoms, where c does not occur in the heads of 
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the rules of P. Finally, let P' := P U {p V q,p V c}. 
conditions hold: 
• SEM(P ' )  C_ SEM(P 'U  {p}). 
• SEM(P ' )  = SEM(P 'U  {q}). 
Then some of the followi'ag 
From the above result and Lemma 5.1 we immediately derive the following the- 
oren l .  
Theorem 5.3. Let SEM be the strong well-founded semantics. {P, r, SEM} can be 
art ignorance test for p, q only if each atom of 7-{ occurs in the head of some r',~.le 
of P. 
PROOF. Suppose not, i.e., there exists an ignorance test (P, r, SEM} and an atom 
c that  does not occur in the head of any rule of P. Let EDB = {(p v q), (p V c)}. 
By Lemma 5.3, at least one of the following inclusions holds: 
SEM(P  U EDB)  <2 SEM(P  U EDB U {p}), 
SEM(PtO EDB)  c= SEM(P  U EDB U {q}) 
and hence, by Lemma 5.1, (P, r, SEM} cannot be an ignorance test, which contra- 
dicts the assumptions. [] 
Therefore, in general, it is impossible to write a program incrementally, because 
any axiomatization of ignorance test must take into account all the extensional 
atoms, and hence the set of extensional predicates hould be fixed in advance. For 
the same reason, whenever a database update introduces a new atom, it might be 
necessary to rewrite all ignorance tests. We conclude that, in general, ignorance 
tests cannot satisfactorily be defined by means of the strong well-founded semantics. 
The same difficulties are encountered with the stationary semantics. The next 
definitions and Theorem 5.4 characterize a large number of cases where STN is 
monotonic. 
Definition 5.~. A Przymusinski state 9 (P-state for short) is a set of clauses each 
of which has one of the following forms: 
Bpl  V "." V Bpn,  
-~Bpl V ... V ~Bpn, 
where Bpi c ?-/'(i = 1 , . . . ,n ) .  
Definition 5.5. Let p,q be atoms and let T be a set of sentences. Let MM(X)  
denote the set of minimal models of X.  p and q are independent in T iff, foi all 
P-states S: 
MM(TU S) = MM(T  U {p} U S) U MM(TU {q} U S). 
9przymusinsk i  states are called s imply "states" in [29], Here the name is changed in order to 
avoid confusion with the other uses of the word "state." 
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Theorem 5.4 (Monotonicity of STN. ) .  I f  p, q are independent in P~B, then 
STN(P)  c_ STN(P  U {p}). 
Given a program P and a pair of atoms p and q, it is very easy to extend P in 
such a way that p and q become independent: 
Lemma 5.4. Let p, q,c, c ~ be distinct atoms of 7-l, with the exception of c and d,  
which may be equal. Let P be a disjunctive program, whose rules contain neither 
c nor c ~ in their heads. Then p, q are independent in 
P'  = [P u {(p v q), (p v c), (q v 
As a consequence, we can extend Theorem 5.3 to the stationary semantics. 
Theorem 5. 5. (P, r, STN)  can be an ignorance test for p, q only if each atom of 7-I 
occurs in the head of some rule of P. 
PROOF. Suppose not, i.e., there exists an ignorance test (P, r, STN)  for p, q, and 
two atoms c and c' (possibly c = d) that do not occur in the head of any rule of 
P.  Let EDB = {(p V q), (p V c), (p V c')}. By Lemma 5.4, p, q are independent in 
[P U EDB]~B. By Lemma 5.4 we get 
STN(P u EDS) c SrN(P o EDS u {p}) 
and hence, by Lemma 5.1, (P, r, STN)  cannot be an ignorance test for p, q, which 
contradicts the assumptions. [] 
The discussion following Theorem 5.3 can be extended to STN.  We conclude 
that  ignorance tests cannot satisfactorilly be defined with the stationary semantics. 
It remains to be seen whether GDWFS,  WF 3, and the many other semantics 
which have been introduced so far (e.g., [30, 11, 10]) suffer from the same limita- 
tions. We leave this as an open problem. It is not yet known whether Theorem 
5.3 can be extended to these semantics. It seems reasonable to conjecture that the 
same difficulties encountered with the strong well-founded and with the stat ionary 
semantics arise also with the other forms of negation-as-assumed-falsity. 
Another interesting open problem is the following: Is it at all possible to define 
an ignorance test with the strong well-founded semantics and STN?  Theorems 5.3 
and 5.5 are all we have, and they tell nothing about the existence of such a test. 
6. LOGIC  PROGRAMS WITH CLASS ICAL  NEGATION 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [17] proposed a language based on literals of the form a or 
~a (where a is an atom) and on rules of the form 
lo *- l l ,  . • . ,  ln, ~1~+1, . . . , ~l.~,  
where 10, . . . , lm are literals. In their framework, stable models are replaced by 
answer sets, which are sets of literals. The definition of answer sets can be obtained 
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from the definition of stable models by replacing all the occurrences of "atom" with 
"literal." There is one further important condition: Every answer set which contains 
two complementary literals should contain all literals. If a program has one answer 
set S, then S is the semantics of the program, which is undefined otherwise. 
m 
Definition 6.1. ANS! (P )  = (S, Lit(S)) if S is the only answer set of P; otherwise. 
ANS! (P )  is undefined. 
By analogy with the stable semantics, we can also define an alternative semantics: 
Definition 6.2. ANS(P)  : ~{(S,  Lit(S)) IS is an answer set of P} if P has an 
answer set; otherwise, ANS(P)  is undefined. 
Answer sets can be captured in several ways: 
• One might translate ach negative literal ~p into a new atom p* and transfbrm 
the resulting normal program P* into /DE> 1 U CA U Colttr, where Contr is the 
following axiom schema: 
p~-qAq* .  
• One might extend the semantics of three-valued autoepistemic logics by al- 
lowing three-valued outside worlds and use simply P~I. 
• One may exploit the relationships between answer sets and N-expansions [38], 
and between the latter and stable expansions [18]. 
Ill this paper we adopt the last approach, which is based on the following em- 
bedding. 
Defirtition 6.3 (Autoepistemic translation Pt>4 [38]). r>4 is obtained by translating 
each rule A ~-- A t , . . . ,A~,  ~A,~+I,. . . ,  ~Am of P into 
A ~ LA1 A ... A LA~/~ L~LA~+~ A. . .  A L-~LA~. 
The correspondence b tween tile semantics of P and P>.I is stated by the following 
theorem. 
Theo'rem 6.1. Let P be a finite propositional logic program with classical negat'ion 
and let M be a set of literals. M is a consistent answer set for P iff M = Lit(B+), 
where B 'is a complete GSE of P~4 U {LG(P~4)} and LG(P~4) is the subjective 
sentence introduced by Gottlob [18]. 
PROOF. By a result of [38], we have that M is an answer set for P iff M = Lit(T), 
where 2' is an N-expansion of P~.t. Moreover, by a result of [18], we have that  T is 
an N-expansion of P~4 iff T is a stable expansion of P~4 U {LG(P~4)}. It Ibllows, 
by Theorem 2.2, that  M is an answer set for P iff M = Lit(B+), where B is a 
complete GSE of P~4 U {LG(P~)}. [] 
A similar result can be obtained by means of translation P~a: 
Corollary 6.1. Let P be a finite propositional logic program with classical negation 
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and let M be a set of literals. M is an answer set for P iff M = Lit(B+), where 
B is a complete GSE ofP~3 U {LG(P~4)}. 
Proof (Sketch). First note that P~a U {LG(P~4)} and P~4 U {LG(P~4)} have 
the same stable expansions, because P~3 and P~4 are equivalent in all stable sets. 
Then P~3 U {LG(P~4)} and P~4 U {LG(P~4)} have the same complete GSE's. The 
corollary follows immediately from this fact and Theorem 6.1. [] 
7. THE AUTOEP ISTEMIC  LOGIC  UNDERLY ING LOGIC  PROGRAMMING 
The autoepistemic framework introduced in the previous ections is actually com- 
posed of two distinct autoepistemie logics, due to the fact that stable models, 
supported models, and answer sets correspond to complete (and hence maximal) 
GSE's, while the other semantics correspond to minimal GSE's. Since the two 
criteria for selecting the GSE's are expressed at the metalevel, they give rise to 
two different logics. However, stable and supported models and answer sets are 
captured also by the minimal GSE's of suitable translations. 
Theorem 7.1. 
(i) I is a stable model of P if and only if I = Atom(B+), where B is a minimal 
GSE of P~,l kJ CA. 
(ii) I is a supported model of P if and only if I = Atom(B+), where B is a 
minimal GSE of P~2 U CA. 
(iii) M is an answer set for P if and only if M = Lit(B+), where B is a minimal 
of u c1  u 
PROOF. (i) I is a stable model of P iff I = Atom(B+), where B is a complete 
stable expansion of P~I (Theorem 4.1). Moreover, by Lemma A.4, B is a complete 
stable expansion of P~l iff B is a minimal GSE of P~I U CA. Point (i) follows 
immediately. 
(ii) and (iii) Similar (apply Theorem 4.4 and Corollary 6.1 instead of Theorem 
4.1). [] 
This fact implies that all the semantics captured by the unifying framework can 
be expressed by means of one logic, based on minimal GSE's only. 
Definition 7.2. 
= ~ N{ B IB isaGSEofP} ,  i fPhasaGSE,  
3AEL(S)  [ undefined, otherwise. 
The relations between logic programs and autoepistemic logics can be rephrased 
as follows: 
{ Atom(3AEL(P~I U CA)), if 3AEL(P~I UCA is ST!(P)  = complete, 
undefined, otherwise, 
ST(P)  = Atom(aAEL(P~I U CA)), 







Atom( aAE L( P>I )), 
Atom(3AEL(P>2 U CA)) 
Atom(aAEL(P~3 u CA)), 
Atom( aAE L ( P~a )), 
{ Lit(aAEL(P~3 U CA U {LG(P>4)})), undefined, 
Lit(aAEL(P>3 U CA tO {LG(P~4)})), 
DC(aAEL( IgB u SA)). 
if it is complete, 
otherwise, 
The epistemic semantics can be rephrased as follows: 
{ DC(3AEL(P~,x U CA)), if 3AEL(P~q u CA) ST!DIs(P) = is complete, 
.undefined, otherwise, 
STDrs(P) = DC(aAEL(P~I U CA)), 
WFDIs (P )  = DC(3AEL(P~,,)), 
FITD~s(P) = DC(aAEL(P>a)). 
Embedding all semantics into one logic: makes it easier to integrate them. The 
advantages of integrating different semantics are discussed in the next section. 
8. D ISCUSSION:  WHAT NEGATION?  
The inability of the old semantics to define ignorance tests does not imply that 
pure negation-as-failure is always better than negation-as-assumed-falsity. Unfor- 
tunately, I have not found a counterpart of ignorance tests, i.e., a class of interesting 
applications that allows us to prove formally that pure negation-as-failure alone is 
not enough--although one may reasonably conjecture that there exist some appli- 
cations that can be naturally formulated with negation-as-assumed-falsity bu  not 
with pure negation-as-failure. Nevertheless, the fact that all the semantics proposed 
so far are based on negation-as-assumed-falsity shows that this kind of negation is 
felt to be natural by many researchers--and, indeed, tile examples that motiw~ted 
the old semantics are convincing. This observation suggests that a flexible logic 
programming language should embody both forms of negation. 
Tile three-valued autoepistemic logic provides an appealing formal foundation for 
such a language, because it captures in a natural way both the stationary semantics 
and the new epistemic semantics. 
Another reason for integrating different negations is that a flexible language 
allows us to improve the trade-off between inferential power and computational 
complexity. For example, it is well known that: 
FIT(P) ,~ VVF(P) c ST(P)  
(provided that ST(P) is defined, of course). Thus, the stable semantics can make 
more inferences than the other semantics, but the cost of this power is high. In 
fact, FIT(P) and WF(P) can be computed efficiently (in linear and quadratic time, 
respectively) while ST(P) is co-NP complete. By assigning different semantics to 
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distinct program modules, it may be possible to improve efficiency and to achieve 
a satisfactory inferential power at the same time. 
Note that there is no reason to commit oneself to a fixed set of nonmonotonic 
negations. As it was suggested in [20], classical negation and the modal operator 
can be taken as the basic constructs. They can be used to mimic existing negations 
and to create new ones. This led to the proposal of autoepistemic logic programming 
language [20, 9]. 
A more extended analysis of the advantages of integrating different semantics 
and the development of integration methods lie beyond the scope of this paper. 
More details can be found in [9]. 
Another language, equivalent to the autoepistemic language can be obtained by 
replacing L with a form of pure negation-as-failure, denoted by N, whose intended 
meaning is ~L. For example, an implication like a ~-- Lb A ~Lc  should be rep- 
resented as a ~- ~b A ~c. Each of the semantics for normal programs can be 
obtained by a combination of pure negation-as-failure and classical negation, where 
the latter needs to be applied only to literals of the form ~¢. The stationary se- 
mantics, instead, needs classical negation to be applied also to ordinary atoms. The 
stationary axioms become 
~pl  V 
Bp~ V 
~Bp l  V 
• • • V -~Pn 
• •. V Bpn  
• " V~Bp~ 
, - -~  A . . .  Apn) ,  
e-  v• . .  Vpn) ,  
,-- V . . -V  "Pn).  
The fact that the stationary semantics can be expressed by a combination of 
classical negation and pure negation-as-failure (that seem to be more elementary 
than negation-as-assumed-falsity) raises an important question: Should a logic pro- 
gramming language be based on pure negation-as-failure and negation-as-assumed 
falsity, or should the latter rather be replaced by classical negation? This problem is 
not only of theoretical interest, since nonmonotonic negation is in general more com- 
plex than classical negation (e.g., ST is co-NP-complete, in the finite propositional 
cases [25], and it is not computable in the general case). This observation suggests 
that classical negation may be preferrable to nonmonotonic negationl whenever 
nonmonotonic inferences are not really needed. 
The above discussion provides new motivations for the study of logic program- 
ming languages with classical negation. An objection is that classical negation, as 
proposed in [17], is not essential, since it might be simulated by translating neg- 
ative literals into new atoms. Roughly speaking, this is possible because classical 
negation--as defined in [17J---cannot be used to make nonconstructive inferences. 
This kind of reasoning can only be accomplished with nonmonotonic negation, 
through f loating conclusions• The above considerations about complexity suggest 
a different role for classical negation, namely, it might be profitable to use it for 
nonconstructive r asoning, leaving nonmonotonic negations for the cases where non- 
monotonic assumptions are really needed. This topic lies beyond the scope of the 
paper and will not be further discussed. 
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9. RELATED WORK 
9.1. Other Formalizations of Doubts 
A three-valued autoepistemic logic was introduced by Przymusinski [31] with a very 
different purpose, namely, showing that the well-founded semantics corresponds to 
suitable three-valued versions of the major nonmonotonic formalisms. No unifying 
frameworks for the semantics of logic programs were proposed in [31]. The relations 
between Przymusinski's three-valued autoepistemic logic and other semantics have 
not been investigated. 
From a technical point of view, the main differences between Przymusinski's logic 
and my three-valued autoepistemic logic lie in the semantics of ordinary sentences: 
in the former logic, such sentences are given a three-valued semantics, while in the 
latter their semantics is classical. Consequently, ordinary tautologies hold in my 
logic, while they do not hold in Przynmsinski's logic. In particular, the tautological 
schema p V ~p (where p ranges over propositional symbols) plays in his logic the 
same role as CA, namely, it makes the three-valued logic collapse to Moore's logic. 
Przymusinski introduced also a family of autoepistemic formalisms, the logics 
of closed beliefs [32], where the agent may have doubts, although the underlying 
models are two-valued. He proved that the stable and the well-founded semantics 
correspond to two different logics of closed beliefs. However, the logics of (:l,)sed 
beliefs have not been proposed as a unifying framework, and the relations with 
o~her semantics have not been investigated. A major difference between the logics 
of closed beliefs and the other autoepistemic formalisms (including our logics) is 
due to the fact that the agent's disbelief~ are derived through some closed 'world 
assumption, which gives the logics of closed beliefls some of the features of circum- 
scription. 
9.2. Strong and Biased Autoepistemic Logics 
In his thesis [20], Kuo proposes autoepistemic logics as a unifying framework for the 
semantics of logic programs and as a tool for deriving new semantics. His framework 
is based on strong autoepistemic logic and biased autoepistemic logic. The l~tter 
can be regarded as a family of logics, generated by different bias orderings. The 
different semantics of logic programs are captured by different translations and 
different logics. Kuo's framework covers some semantics which are not considered 
in this paper, like the upper well-founded semantics and programs with exceptions. 
On the other hand, Kuo's framework does not cover Kunen's semantics nor the 
semantics of disjunctive programs. 
9.3. Stable Classes 
Baral and Subrahmanian [4] generalized efault and autoepistemic logics by re- 
placing the notion of fixpoint with the notion of stable class, which collapses to 
the notion of cycle in the finite propositional case. In this way, they obtained 
well-founded versions of default and autoepistemic logics. Recently, Yuan [41] in- 
troduced a similar framework for autoepistemic logic that combines aspects of stable 
classes and N-expansions. The major semantics captured by the two fl'ameworks 
are the stable, well-founded, and stable class semantics for normal programs. Both 
frameworks are based on two-valued models. 
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The main advantage of three-valued autoepistemic logic over two-valued ap- 
proaches (including the above two approaches, Kuo's framework and autoepistemic 
logics of closed beliefs) is that different logics can be captured within the logic, 
through simple axioms like CA. Thus three-valued autoepistemic logic induces flex- 
ible logic programming/knowledge representation languages that make it possible to 
choose and/or combine different reasoning modes without resorting to extralogical 
features. On the contrary, in the aforementioned two-valued approaches, different 
logics can be captured only at the metalevel, by imposing constraints on stable 
expansions or stable classes. The reason is that two-valued approaches have little 
or no ability to represent introspective knowledge about doubts. 
It is worth noting that Yuan's logic and the well-founded formalisms by Baral 
and Subrahmanian can be regarded as two-valued, strongly grounded counterparts 
of the three-valued autoepistemic logic based on the simplest form of admissible 
extension: 
As(B)  = {B' I B' is a belief state and B' _D B}. 
Accordingly, Yuan's logic and well-founded autoepistemic logic have the limitation 
illustrated in Example 2.1: when classical negation occurs in the premises, the logic 
easily collapses to monotonic modal system N. For instance, {=p *- -,Lp, =q *-- 
=Lq, pVq} has one generalized stable belief(i.e., Yuan's counterpart of GSE's) that 
does not allow us to deduce ~-L¢ for any ¢, including the propositional symbols 
that do not occur in the premises. 
9.4. Formalisms Based on Two Modalities 
Both the language of epistemic specifications introduced by Gelfond [15] and the 
language of Przymusinski's episternic logic [33] are essentially based on two modal- 
ities: 
• Epistemic specifications contain negation as failure (~), which can be re- 
garded as a disbelief operator, and a modal operator K which can be regarded 
as a metabelief operator. 
• The language of epistemic logic contains two classes of special atoms (of the 
form £p and :Dp, respectively) which capture autoepistemic beliefs and truth 
in minimal models. 
Thanks to double modalities, the two formalisms are very powerful and expres- 
sive, but, in general, they seem no easier to understand than 3AEL: epistemic 
specifications are given their meaning by two nested fixpoint constructions, corre- 
sponding to "~" and "K', respectively. Theories in epistemic logic are given a 
meaning through a fixpoint equation where autoepistemic introspection and mini- 
mal entailment are simultaneously performed. It is not difficult to see that different 
modalities may interact in subtle ways, and as usual, in order to prove interesting 
properties of theories, such as consistency and iterative characterizations, one has 
to restrict attention to theories that are closely related to logic programs and allow 
only limited forms of interaction between the two modalities. 
The author believes that a serious comparison of the above formalisms with 
three-valued autoepistemic logic can be achieved only through formal techniques, 
such as formal characterizations of their expressive power or techniques anMogous 
to ignorance tests. However, we may sketch a preliminary comparison. 
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A possible limitation of epistenfic specifications has been pointed out by Przy- 
musinski [33]: apparently, they cannot capture the well-founded semantics. 
Epistemic logic and three-valued autoepistemic logic capture almost the same 
semantics of normal and disjunctive logic programs (it is not yet clear whether the 
disjunctive partial stable semantics can be captured by 3AEL and whether Fitting's 
semantics and Kunen's semantics can be captured by epistemic logic). Nonetheless, 
we can draw a subtle distinction between the two approaches: Przymusinski's main 
goal is providing a simple, direct way of expressing both autoepistemic reasoning 
and model minimization, while one of the goals of the author is analyzing the 
relationships between the two forms of reasoning by defining model minimizar.ion 
in terms of the belief operator (through the stationary schemata). Epistemic logic 
says little about such relations, for model minimization is expressed through ad hoc 
constructs. 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown how one three-valued autoepistemic logic, called 3AEL, can capture 
most of the major semantics of logic programs. Although many unifying frameworks 
have been proposed since our three-valued autoepistemic logic was introduced, its 
positive features are not subsumed in those of any other formalism. 
The main relations between three-valued autoepistemic logics and logic programs 
are summarized in Table 1. The autoepistemic framework has suggested many new 
semantics; some of them, like FITDIs and KUNms, are apparently too weak to 
be useful; some others, like the semantics induced by the least GSE of P~2 and 
TABLE 1. Summary of the Main Relations. 
~'ans lat ion Complete GSE's  Min. GSE's 3AEL lfp(~)T,-) Or~ T ~v 
Nor~raal Programs 
P~ ~ Stable models WF WF 
P~2 Supported New New 
models 
P~a Supported F IT  F IT  
models 
I~1 U CA Stable models Stable models ST 
P~2 U CA Supported models Supported models ,~;UPP 
I°~3 U CA Supported models Supported models SUPP 
WF 
New 
F IT  KUN 
Disjunctive Progrums 
P~B USA STN STN STN 
1~1 New WFDI  S WFDI  S WFDI  S 
['~3 New F ITDI  S F ITD I  S F ITD I  S 
P~I U CA New New STDI  S 
P~3 u CAO 
LG(P~4) 
Programs with Classical Negation 
Answer sets Answer sets ANS 
I'(UNDI,b ~ 
Note." ST! equals ST when the latter is complete; otherwise, ST! is undefined. New 
notions without a name are labeled "new." Empty boxes correspond to notions 
that have not been discussed in this paper. 
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ST!DIS, STDIS, and WFOlS, have satisfactory inferential capabilities and enjoy 
some interesting properties. 
• P~2 induces semantics that can recognize and ignore the rules whose body 
cannot be satisfied. 
• The epistemic semantics allow definition of a class of applications, called 
ignorance tests, that cannot be satisfactorily defined by means of the old 
semantics for disjunctive programs. 
Moreover, through the epistemic semantics, the framework led to the defini- 
tion of a new notion of negation, that we called pure negation-as-failure, in con- 
trast with the negation underlying the old semantics, which we called negation-as- 
assumed-falsity. We proved that the latter can be expressed as a combination of 
pure negation-as-failure and classical negation. 
Ignorance tests are interesting per se; they provide a criterion for comparing 
different semantics. The criterion is based on the ability to define programs that 
preserve their intended meaning in different contexts. In this respect, ignorance 
tests are similar to the principle of stratification [36]. Ignorance tests and the prin- 
ciple of stratification are of practical interest. They allow a formal characterization 
of the semantics that allow certain applications to be implemented in a modular 
way. 
Some of the most interesting applications of the framework had to be left for 
future work. We have argued that both negation-as-assumed-falsity and pure 
negation-as-failure are needed, and that three-valued autoepistemic logics provide 
an appealing formal foundation for a language with both negations. Moreover, by 
means of three-valued autoepistemie logics, different semantics for normal programs 
can be integrated, in order to achieve a better trade-off between inferential power 
and computational complexity. Finally, the possibility of expressing negation-as- 
assumed-falsity in terms of pure-negation-as-failure andclassical negation, provides 
new motivations for the study of logic programming languages with classical nega- 
tion. 
APPENDIX  A: PROOFS 
First we state some easy technical lemmas that will be applied in the proofs of the 
main results. 
Lemma A.1 (Elementary properties of I=B). For all belief states B for all sets of 
£L-sentences S, and for all £L-sentences ~ :
(i) I fCE  B +, thenS~BL~.  
(ii) I f  ¢ E B - ,  then S ~B ~L¢. 
Moreover, if S is B-consistent: 
(iii) If S~BL¢,  then C E B +. 
(iv) If S~B ~L¢, then ¢ C B- .  
PROOF. (i) If ~ E B +, then, for all B-interpretations (I, B), we have (I, B) ~ L¢ 
(by the definition of satisfaction). It follows immediately that S ~B L¢. 
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(ii) Similar to the proof of (i). 
(iii) We prove the contrapositive, that is, fJ ¢ B + implies S ~B Lf .  By hy- 
potehsis S is B-consistent. Let (I, B) be a B-model of S. If ~ ~ B +, we have 
(I, B) ~: L¢ and hence S ~s  L'¢. 
(iv) Similar to the proof of (iii). [] 
Lemma A.2 (Elementary properties of .4s and Os). For all sets of EL-sentences 









B' • As(B) implies S eB' Os(B) +. 
S c_ (gs(B) +. 
c B + implies L~ • Os(B) +. 
E B-  implies -~LfJ • Os(B) +. 
If S is B-consistent, hen L~ • Os(B) + implies 0 E B +. 
If S is B-consistent, hen ~L~/~ Os(B) + implies ¢ E B- .  
If S is B-consistent, hen Os(B) + is B-consistent. 
Let B be a fixpoint of Os. B is a GSE of S iff S is B-consistent. 
PROOF. (i) and (ii) follow easily fl'om the definition of Os(B) +. 
(iii) We have ~b E B+: 
only if, for all B' D B, ~ • B '+, 
only if, for all B' E As(B),  g) E B '+, 
only if, for all B' E As(B) ,S  ~B' LV~, 
only if L~ E Os(B) +. 
(iv) Similar to the proof of (iii). 
(v) It suffices to show that ~ ~ B + follows from the assumptions (a) S is B- 
consistent and (b) L~ E Os(B) +. By (a) we have B ~ As(B). Then (by (i)) we 
have S ~ Os(B) + and hence, by (b), S ~B L~. By Lemma A.l(iii), this implies 
~ JeB  +. 
(vi) Similar to the proof of (v). 
(vii) If S is B-consistent, then (a) B • As(B) (by definition of As) and (b) 
there exists a B-model (I, B) of S. From (a) and (i), it follows that S ~B Os(B) + 
and hence, by (b), (I, B) ~ Os(B) +, which implies that Os(B) + is B-consistent. 
(viii) Since B is a fixed point of Os, we have that B is a GSE of S iff B 
is epistemically consistent. Therefore, it suffices to show that B is epistemically 
consistent iff S is B-consistent. 
Only If: Assume that B is epistemically consistent. Then B has a B-model 
(I ,B), such that ( I ,B)  ~ B +. By (ii), we have S C_ Os(B) + = B + and hence 
(I, B) ~ S, which proves that S is B-consistent. 
If. Assume that S is B-consistent. By (vii), Os(B) + is B-consistent. Since 
Os(B)  + = B + we have that B + is B-consistent and hence B is epistemically 
consistent. [] 
Pwofs for Section 2 
Theorem 2. i. If B is a generalized stable expansion, then B is stable, that is: 
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(i) B + ~ ~b implies ¢ E B +. 
(ii) LOEB + iff ~b E B +. 
(iii) -~n¢ E B + iff ¢ E B - .  
PROOF. Suppose that B is a GSE of S and note that this implies B = @s(B). 
(i) We have B + I= ~b: 
iff, for all belief states B', B + ~B' ~b, 
only if, for all B' E As(B), B + ~U' ga, 
only if, for all B' E As(B) ,  Os(B) + ~B' ~b (because B = @s(B)), 
only if, for all B' E As(B) ,  S ~B' ~b, (by Lemma A.2(i)), 
only if, ~b E 13s(B) + = B +. 
(ii) B is a GSE of S and a fixed point of Os. Thus, by Lemma A.2 (viii), we 
have that S is B-consistent. By Lemma A.2(iii, v), this implies that Ltb E Os(B) + 
holds iff ~b E B +. Then (ii) immediately follows. 
(iii) Similar to the proof of (ii). [] 
Lemma 2.i (Monotonicity). B1 C B2 implies Os(B1 ) C Os(B2). 
PROOF. Assume that B1 C B2. We have to show that Os(B1) C @x(B2). By 
assumption we have 
As(B1) = {B' I B' is a belief state and B' D B1 and S is B-consistent} 
D {B' I B' is a belief state and B' D B2 and S is B-consistent} 
= As(B2). 
From the above disequality and the definition of Os it follows easily that @s(B1) _c 
Os(B2). [] 
Lemma A.3 (Elementary properties of complete belief states). If B is a complete 
belief state, then, for all sets of £,L-sentences S and all EL-sentences ¢ : 
(i) S ~B ¢ holds iff S U LB + U -~LB + P ¢, where 
LB + = { LataEB+},  
-~LB + = {-~Lcr laEB+}. 
Moreover, if S is B-consistent: 
(ii) As(B)  = {B}. 
(iii) Os(B) + : {¢ I S U LB + U ~LB + F- 4)}. 
(iv) Os(B) -  -- {4) I S U LB + U ~LB + J/-4)}. 
PROOF. (i) For all belief states B' we have (I, B') I= LB + U ~LB+: 
iff (I,B') b {La I~r E B +} U {-~L~r I cr E B+}, 
iff ( I ,B ' )  ~ {L~r I~r E B +} U {-,L~ I~r E B-}  (by completeness of B), 
iff B' _D B, 
iff B' = B (because complete belief states are maximal). 
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In other words, the set of models of LB + O ~LB + is precisely the set of B- 
interpretations. It follows that: 
(a) S ~B ¢ is equivalent to S U LB + O ~LB + b 4. 
It follows also that all the models of LB + U ~LB+ are complete, and hence: 
(b) S U LB + U -~LB + ~ ¢ holds iff every complete model of S u LB + U ~LB + 
satisfies ¢. 
Note that complete models are in one-to-one correspondence with classical models 
(i.e., classical truth assignments o ordinary and autoepistemic atoms). By (b), 
this implies that: 
(c) SU LB  + U-~LB + b@holds i f fSULB + U~LB+ be .  
From (a) and (c) we immediately get (i). 
(ii) Complete belief states are maximal belief states, and hence 
As(B)  c_ {B' I B' is a belief state and B' D B} = {B}. 
We are left to show that As(B)  D {B}, which follows immediately from the as- 
sumption that S is B-consistent. 
(iii) and (iv) follow immediately from (i) and (ii) and the definition of Os. [] 
Theorem 2.2. For all sets of £L-sentenees S and T ,T  is a consistent stable ex- 
pansion of S iff (T, T} is a complete GSE of S. 
PROOF. If: If (T,T} is a complete GSE of S, then {T,T) is a fixed point of Os. 
From this fact and Lemma A.3(iii), we have 
T = <T,T> + : (95,(<T,T}) + = {~ I b" U LT U =LT ~ ~}. 
This proves that T is a stable expansion of S. Moreover, since GSE's are epis- 
temically consistent, (T, T) must have an autoepistemic model, which implies that 
T is consistent. 
Only if: Assume that T is a consistent stable expansion of S. We have to show 
that (T,T} is an epistemically consistent fixed point of Os. By the definition of 
stable expansion we have 
T= {~1 SuLTu ~LT~ ~}. 
It follows immediately, by Lemma A.3(iii, iv), that (T, T) is a fixed point of Os. 
We are left to show that (T, T) '.s epistemically consistent. By assumption, T has a 
model, that will be denoted by (I, B). Note that T contains LT  U ~LT; therefore, 
(I, B) must satisfy LT  U ~LT.  This implies B = (T, T) (see the proof of Lemma 
A.3(i)). It follows immediately that (I, B) is an autoepistemic model of (T, T',,, i.e., 
(T, T}, is epistemically consistent. [] 
Lemma A.~. The following are equivalent: 
(i) B is a complete GSE of S. 
(ii) B is a GSE of S U CA. 
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(iii) B is a minimal GSE of S U CA. 
PROOF. (i) ¢=~ (ii): The reader may easily verify that: 
(a) S u CA is B-consistent iff S is B-consistent and B is complete. Then derive: 
(b) If S U CA is B-consistent, hen @Such(B) = @s(B). In order to prove this, 
assume that S U CA is B-consistent. By (a), we have that S is B-consistent 
and B is complete. Then Lemma A.3(iii, iv) can be applied to S U CA, S, 
and B, and we get 
@suaA(B) + 
= {¢ I S U CA U LB + U ~LB + k ¢} by Lemma A.3 (iii) 
= {¢ I S U LB + U -~LB + ~ ¢} because CA is a set of tautologies 
= @8(B) + by Lemma A.3(iii). 
Similarly, derive @Such(B)- ---- @s(B)-. It follows that @SUch(B) ---- @s(B). 
(c) If B is a GSE of S U CA, then B is a complete GSE of S. In order to prove 
this, assume that B is a GSE of S U CA. Then S U CA is B-consistent (by 
Lemma A.2(viii)). By (a), we have that B is complete, so we are left to 
show that B is a GSE of S. Since S U CA is B consistent, (b) implies that 
@Such(B) ---- @s(B). From this equality and the assumption, it follows that 
B must be an epistemically consistent fixed point of @s(B), hence, a GSE of 
S. 
(d) I fB  is acomplete GSEofS ,  thenB is a GSE of SUCA.  In fact, i fB  is 
a complete GSE of S, then S is B-consistent (by Lemma A.2 (viii)) and B 
is complete, and hence, by (a), we have that S U CA is B-consistent. By 
(b), this implies that @Such(B) ---- @s(B). Since B must be an epistemically 
consistent fixed point of @s(B), it follows that B must be an epistemically 
consistent fixed point of @SUch(B), hence, a GSE of S U CA. 
From (c) and (d), conclude that (i) and (ii) are equivalent. 
(ii) ¢=~ (iii): Since all the GSE's of S U CA are complete, and complete belief 
states are maximal belief states, the GSE's of S U CA are never comparable with 
each other. It follows that they are all minimal GSE's. Consequently, (ii) and (iii) 
are equivalent. [] 
l 
Theorem 2.3. If T is a consistent stable expansion of S, then (T,T} is a GSE of 
S U CA. Conversely, if B is a GSE of S U CA, then B + is a consistent stable 
expansion of S and B -  = T. 
PROOF. It follows immediately from Theorem 2.2 and Lemma A.4(i, ii). [] 
Theorem 2.4. Let S be an implicative set of sentences and let B = l f p( @ s ). Then 
the following are equivalent: 
(i) S has a GSE. 
(ii) B + is consistent. 
(iii) B is the least GSE of S. 
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and Cons(S,B') is consistent, then let I be a model of Cons( S, B'). By (ii), 
(I, B') is a model of S and hence, S is B'-consistent. It follows immediately that 
B' E As(B). 
(iv) We have S DB 99: 
iff, for all B-models (I, B) of S: (I, B) ~ 99, 
iff, for all B-models (I, B) of S: I ~ 99, 
iff, for all (classical) models I of Cons(S, B)I  I = 99 (by (ii)) 
iff Cons(S, B) ~- 99. 
(v) We prove that 99 ff Os(B) + iff Cons(S, B)/-99 which is equivalent. We have 
99 ¢ es(B)+: 
iff, for some B I C .As(B), S ~=B' 99, 
iff, for some B'E  As(B),Cons(S,B')t/-99, 
iff Cons(S, B) t/-99. (Proof of the last equivalence: assume that, for some B' E 
As(B), Cons(S, B')/-99. Note that B' _D B and hence, by (i), Cons(S, B) c_ 
Cons(S, B'). It follows, by monotonicity of classical ogic, that Cons(S, B) 
F/99. Conversely, if Cons(S, B) ~ 99, then let B' = B. Obviously, we have 
B' D B and Cons(S, B') }z_99 and hence, by (iii), B' E .As(B).) 
(vi) We prove that 99 ¢ O(B)-- iff, for some B' 2 B, Cons(S, B') is consistent 
and Cons(S,B') t- 99. We have 99 ~ O(B): 
iff, for some B' E As(B), S De' 99, 
iff, for some B' E As(B), Cons(S, B') ~- 99 (by (iv)), 
iff, for some B' D B, Cons(S, B') is consistent and Cons(S, B') ~ 99 (by (iii)). 
(vii) ~ E B+: 
iff 99 E Os(B) +.(because B = Os(B)), 
iff Cons(S, B) F- 99 (by (v)). 
(viii) It follows immediately from (vi). [] 
Lemma A.5 (Elementary properties of quasiprograms). Let S be a 
quasiprogram. For all belief states B, B', for all £n-sentences ¢, and for all or- 
dinary sentences 99: 
(i) S is B-consistent. 
(ii) B' E As(B) iff B' D_ B. 
(iii) 99 e Os(B)-  iff, for all B' :~ B, Cons(S, B') /-99. 
(iv) L¢E  Os(B) + iff ¢ E B +. 
(v) ~L¢ E Os(B) + iff ¢ E B- .  
(vi) LeE  Os(B)-  iff O E B- .  
(vii) ~n~b E ~)s(B)- iff ¢ E B +. 
PROOF. (i) By definition of quasiprograms, Heads(S) has a (classical) model I. 
Note that, for all B, (I, B) is a model of Heads(S), hence, a model of S. It follows 
that S is always B-consistent. 
(ii) It follows immediately from (i) and the definition of As. 
(iii) We have 99 E •s(B)-:  
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PROOF. We will prove the following implications: (i) ~ (ii), (ii) ~ (iii), (iii) 
(i). 
(i) ~ (ii): Assume that S has a GSE 13'. t?' must be epistemically consistent; 
consequently, 13'+ must be consistent. Moveover, 13' must be fixed point of (3s. 
Then B = Ifp(Os) g 13' and hence, B + C_ 13'+. Since B '+ is consistent, it follows 
immediately that B + is consistent, too. 
(ii) ~ (iii): Assume that B + is consistent and let (I, B') be a model of B +. We 
have: 
(a) I I = Cons(S, 13). In fact, Lemma 2.2(vii) implies 13+ D_ Cons(S,B). From 
the assumption (I, 13') ~ B + derive (I, B') ~ Cons(S, 13) and hence, I I = 
Cons(S, B) (because the interpretation of ordinary sentences, in (I, B'), is 
determined by I). 
(b) S is B-consistent. In fact, (I, B) ~ S (by (a) and Lemma 2.2(ii)). 
(c) B is a GSE of S (by (b) and Lemma a.2(viii)). 
Finally note that 13, being the least fixed point of Os, is necessarily the least GSE 
of S. 
(iii) ~ (i): Trivial. [] 
Lemma 2.2 (Elementary properties of implicative theories). If S is an implicative 
set of sentences and 99 is an ordinary sentence, then: 
(vii) 
(viii) 
(i) B c C_ B' implies Cons(S, B) c_ Cons(S, B'). 
(ii) (I, B) I = S iff I ~ Cons(S, B). 
(iii) B' E As(B) iff B' D B and Cons(S, B') is consistent. 
(iv) S ~B 99 iff Cons(S, B) [- 99. 
(v) 99 • es(B)+ iff Cons(S, B) 99. 
(vi) 99 • Os(B) -  iff for all B' D_ B, either Cons(S, B') is inconsistent or Cons(S, 
B') ?-99. 
Moreover, if B is a fixed point of Os : 
99 • B + iff Cons(S, B) F- 99. 
99 • B -  iff for all B' D_ B, either Cons(S,B') is inconsistent or Cons(S, 
13') y-99. 
PROOF. (i) The reader may easily verify that Kleene's valuation is monotonic 
with respect to classical connectives, that is, if B _C B ' ,a  does not contain *---, 
and a is true (resp. false) in ( I ,B) ,  then cr is true (resp. false) in (I,B'). It 
follows that (99 *--- ~) E Active(S,B) only if (99 ~-- or) E Active( S, B'), that is, 
Active(S, B) C_ Active(S, B'). Conclude that Cons(S, B) C_ Cons(S, B'). 
(ii) We prove that (I, B) ~ S iff I ~= Cons(S, B), which is equivalent. We have 
B) g= s: 
iff for some rule (99 *-- a) E S :  (I, B) ~ (99 *--- ~), 
iff for some rule (99 ~-- ~) E S :  (I, B) ~ ~ and (I, B) ~= 99, 
iff for some rule (99 *--- a) E S, (99 *--- ~) E Active(S, B) and I ~ 99, 
iff g= Cons(S, B). 
(iii) If B'  E .As(B), then B' D B and there is a model (I, B') of S. By (ii), we 
have I ~ Cons(S, B') and hence Cons(S, B') is consistent. Conversely, if B' D_ B 
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iff, for all B' E As (B) ,  S I/=B, ~o by definition of Os, 
iff, for all B' m B, S V=B , g), by (ii), 
iff, for all B' D B, Cons(S, B') ~#qo by Lemma 2.2(iv). 
(iv) By (i), S is B-consistent. 
Os(B) iff ~ < B +. 
(v) Similar to the proof of (iv). 
(vi) We have L¢c  (gs(B)-:  
By Lemma A.2(iii, v), this implies that Lqb C 
iff, for all B' E As (B) ,  S ~=u' L¢. 
iff, for all B' E As(B),  ¢ ~ B '+ by Lelnma A.2(iii, v), 
iff, for all belief states B' D_ B, ¢ ~ B '+ by(ii), 
iff <b c B - .  
(vii) Similar to the proof of (vi). [] 
Theorem 2.5. If S is a quasiprogram, then l f p( t3 s ) is the least USE of S. 
PROOF. Let B = l fp(Os).  By Lemma A.5(i), S is B-consistent. Then, by Lemma 
A.2(viii), B is a GSE of S and hence, by Theorem 2.4, B is the least GSE of S. [] 
Proofs for Section 4 
Relations between Opt,, [IF, and q?p 
Lemma 4.1 For all complete belief states B, 





IIp ( Atom( B + ) ) = -[q2p(Atom(B))-]  by definition of ~p 
= -[Atom(Op~ (B))-] by Lemma 4.2 
= Atom(Op,~ (B) - )  
= Atom(@p,l(B) +) because B is complete. 
For all belief states B, grip(Atom(B)) : Atom( O p~ l ( B ) ). 
In order to prove this lemma, note that P~I is equivalent to the quasiprogram U, 
obtained from P>I by replacing each implication (a +-- bl A. •. Abn A ~Lcl A. •. A-~Lc,~) 
with the equivalent implication 
((a +- bl A . .. A bn) +- ~Lcl A . .. A ~Lcm). 
U enjoys the following property: 
Lemma A.6. For all belief states B, Cons(U, B) = p I ,  where I = Atom(-B--). 




Cons(U, B)  = Ord(U) U I ") U nd 
Ord(U) U {a ~-- bl A . . . A bn ] 
((a +-- bl A . . .  A bn) e -  ~Lc  1 A • A ~Lern)  E U 
and cl, . . . ,cm c B -  } 
{a i a E Atom(P)}  U {a .-- bl A . . A b~ I 
(a *- bl A . . .  A b~ A ~Cl A . . .  A ~c,~) E P 
and cl, . . . , c~ ~ B-  } 
P~, where  I = Atom(B- ) .  
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2. Note that  Op,~ = Ou, where U is the quasiprogram 
corresponding to P~I. Thus, it suffices to show that  
Atom(Ou(B) )  = k~p(Atom(B) )  = (Z Ip ( I ) , - l i p ( J ) ) ,  
where 
I = -Atom(B) -  = Atom(B- ) ,  
,l = Atom(B)  + = Atom(B+) .  
(a) For all atoms a, a E Ou(B)  + iff a E l ip ( I ) .  In fact, we have a E Ou(B)+:  
iff Cons(U, B)  ~- a by Lemma 2.2(v), 
iff pZ F- a by Lemma A.6(ii), 
i f f  a E lm(P I ) ,  
i f f  a E [ i v ( I ) .  
(b) 1-IF(J) = maxE,  where E = { l ip ( I ' )  I I '  = Atom(B ' - )andB '  ~ B}.  For 
all belief states B '  2 B we have B ' -  D B + and hence, I '  = Atom(B ' - )  
A tom(B +) = J. Since l ip  is antimonotonic (see [4]), this implies l ip ( I ' )  c_ 
I Ip ( J ) .  This shows that [ I F ( J )  is an upper bound for E. We are left to show 
that  I Ip ( J )  is also a member of E. In order to prove this, let B '  = <B+,B+}. 
Obviously, B '  _~ B and hence, l ip ( I  t) E E. Moreover, I '  = Atom(B ' - )  = J .  
It  follows immediately that  Up( J )  E E. 
(c) For all atoms a,a E Ou(B) -  iff a ¢ l ip ( J ) .  In fact, we have a E Ou(B) - :  
iff, for all B'  D B,  Cons(U, B ' )  I-a, 
iff, for all B t ~ B, pV }Ca, where I t = Atom(B ' - ) ,  
iff, for all B'  ~ B,  a ~ lm(Y) ,  where I '  = Atom(B ' - ) ,  
iff, for all B '  D B, a ¢ l ip (F ) ,  where I t = Atom(Bt - ) ,  
iff, for all I Ip (F )  E E ,a  ¢ Hp(F ) ,  where I t = Atom(B ' - ) ,  
iff, a ¢ l ip  (J) by (b). 
By (a) and (c) we have Atom(Ou(B) )  = ( r ip ( I ) , - l ip ( J )} .  [] 
Relations between (~P,2, OPt3, and Fittingts Operator 
Lemma A.7. Leta  = L¢ lA . . .ALCnA~L¢ lA . . .A~L¢m,  let i  range over l . . . .  ,n,  
and let j range over 1 , . . . ,  m. For all belief states B ,  the following are equivalent: 
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(i) For all B' D B,/=B' or. 
(ii) Some of the following conditions hold: 
• For some i and j,¢{ : J j .  
• For some i, Vi E B - .  
• For some j, ~/~j C B +. 
PROOF. There are two possibilities: 
(a) For some i and j, ¢i = ~j.  
(b) For all i and j, ¢i ¢ g?j. 
If (a) holds, then a is obviously unsatisfiable (it contains the complementary 
literals L~i and ~Lf j  = ~L~) .  It follows immediately that  (i) and (ii) are both 
true. 
We are left to show that  (i) and (ii) are equivalent under the assumption that  
(b) holds. We have: 
(c) If (ii) holds, then (i) holds. In order to prove this, assume that  (ii) holds. 
Since we assumed (b), there are only two possibilities: 
• For some i ,¢ i  E B - .  
• For somej ,¢ jEB  +. 
In the first case, for all belief states B '  D B, we have ~i c B ' - ,  which implies 
~B '  ~LqSi and hence ~=B, ~. Similarly, in the second case, we have that  for 
all belief states B' D_ B ,~ j  ~ B '+, which implies ~u'  L~/)j and hence ~=u, ~. 
Conclude that  (i) holds. 
(d) If (ii) does not hold, then (i) does not hold. In order to prove this, assume 
that  (ii) does not hold, that  is, for all i and j ,¢  ~ B-  and ~,j ¢ B--. It 
follows that  (B + U {q~l,..-, ~)~}) n (B -  U {~,~,... ~})  = 0, and hence B '  = 
{B + © {¢t , . - . ,  ¢~}, B -  U { '~1, . . . '~})  is a belief state. Obviously, we have 
B' D_ B and ~B'  ~, that  is, (i) does not hold. 
Thus, by (c) and (d), (i) and (ii) are equivalent. [] 
Lemma A.8. Let P be any program and let P' be the program, obtained from P by 
eliminating all the clauses that contain a pair of complementary literals ~n the 
body. For all belief states B, 
• p, (Atom(B))  = Atom(Op,~ (B)). 
PROOF. For all atoms a, we have a E Op~(B)+:  
iff Cons(P~2, B) F- a by Lemma 2.2 (v), 
iff a c Cons(P~2, B) because Cons(P~2, B) is a set of atoms, 
iff either a c P~2 or there exists (a *-- ~) E P~2 s.t. ~B ~ by definition of Cons, 
iff either a E P~2 or there exists (a ~-- Lbl A. • • A Lb~ A ~LCl A . . .  A ~Lc,~) c P~2 
s.t. bl , . . . ,b~ ~ B + and c l , . . . , cm E B - ,  
iff either a ff P or there exists (a ~-- bl A .. .  A br~ A ~Cl A ..-  A ~cm) C P s.t. 
b l , - . . ,b . ,~B + andCl , . . . , cmEB- ,  
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iff there a E P or there exists (a +--- bl A --. A b~ A "-'el A " ' '  A " 'Cm) C P t  s.t. 
bl , . . . ,b~ E B + and c l , . . . , cm E B - ,  (by noting that bl , . . .bn E B + and 
c l , . . . , cm E B -  imply bi # cj, for all i , j ,  hence (a +--- bl A - . -Ab ,~ /k ~--Cl A 
• . -A  ~cm) E P ' ) ,  
iff a E ~p,(Atom(B))  +, 
which shows that  ¢p, (Atom(B))  + = Atom(@p~(B))  +. Similarly, we have a E 
O..(B)-: 
i f fa¢  
the 
i f f  aE  
iff for all B' D B, Cons(P~2, B') ~a by Lemma A.5(iii), 
iff for all B' D_D_ B, a ~ Cons(P~2, B') because Cons(P~2, B') is a set of atoms, 
iff for all B '  D B, a ¢ P~2 and, for all rules (a +-- ~r) E P~2, ~B '  ~, 
iff a 9~ P~2 and, for all rules (a +-- ~r) E P~2, and all B '  __D B, ~u '  ~, 
iff a ~ P~2 and, for all rules (a ~ Lbl A .. .  A Lb,~ A ~Lcl  A .-. A ~Lc~)  E P~2 
some of the following conditions hold: 
for some i and j, bi = cj, 
for some i, b~ E B - ,  
for some j, cj ~ B + (by Lemma A.7), 
P '  and, for all rules (a ~-- bl A .-. A b~ A ~Cl A . . .  A ~Cm) E P '  some of 
following conditions hold: 
for some i, bi E B - ,  
for some j, cj E B +, 
¢p, (Atom(B)) - .  
This proves that ~p, (Atom(B) ) -  = Atom(Op~2(B))- , which completes the 
proof. [] 
Theorem 4.5. Let P be any program and let P' be the program obtained from P by 
eliminating all the clauses that contain a pair of complementary Iiterals in the 
body. Finally, let B be the least GSE of P~2. Then 
Atom(B)  = F IT (P ' ) .  
PROOF. It follows easily from Lemma A.8. [] 
Lemma 4.4. For all belief states B, ~p(Atom(B) )  = Atom(O2p~a (B)). 
PROOF. For all atoms a, we have a E O~a(B)+:  
iff either a E Pt,3 or there exists (a ~-- LLbl A. . . A LLbn A L-,Lcl A" . . A L~Lc,~) E 
P~3 s.t. Lb l , . . . ,  Lbn E Op~.~ (B) + and - ' Lc l , . . . ,  ~Lc,~ E Og~3 (B) + (see the 
proof of Lemma A.8), 
iff either a E P~3 or there exists (a +--- LLb lA . . .ALLbnAL~Lc lA . .  "AL~Lcm) E 
P~3 s.t. b l , . . . ,  b,~ E B + and c l , . . . ,  cm E B -  (by Lemma A.5(iv, v)), 
iff either a E P or there exists (a ~- bl A .-- A bn A ~Cl A -..  A ~c,~) E P s.t. 
bl , . . . ,bn  E B + and Cl , . . . ,cm E B - ,  
iff a E Op(Atom(B))  +. 
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This proves that  Op(Atorn(B)) + = Atom(e2p~ (B)) +. 
We are left to show that  Op(Atom(B))-  = Atom(q~2&3(B)) -, We have a ¢ 
Op~, : , (B ) - :  
ill" a ¢ P~3 and, for all rules (a ,--- LLblA. . .ALLb,~AL~LclA.. .AL~Lcm) ¢ P~'a 
the following condition holds: for some i, Lb~ c O&a (B) -  or, for some j, ~Lcj 
Oe~ (B) -  (see Lemma A.8), 
iff a ~ P and, for all rules (a ~- bl A • •. A b~ A ~Cl A • • - A ~Cr~) E P some of the 
following conditions hold: 
• for some i, bi E B -  
• for some j, cj E B + 
iff a ¢ Op(Atom(B))- .  
This proves that  ~p(Atom(B)) -  
proof. 
(by Lemma A.5(vi, vii)), 
= Atom(O&3(B))-,  which completes the 
Proofs for Section 5 
First note that  Cons is compositional, when applied to P~,B USA, that  is: 
Proposition A.1. For all B and B' ,  
Cons( P~B USA, B U B')  = P~B U Cons(SA, B) U Cons(SA, B'). 
PROOF. Straightforward from the definitions of P~B and SA. [] 
Then we need a technical lemma that  will be helpful for many of the following 
results. 
Lemma A.9. Let S be a P-state, let I be a minimal model of P~B U S, and let I' 
be a (not necessarily minimal) model of P~B. If I' C I, then 
(r n n) = ( /n n )  
PROOF. Suppose not. Then, for some minimal model I of P~,~ U S, there exists 
a model I '  of P~B such that  I '  C I and ( I '  A 7-l) ¢ ( I  N 7-/). Let 
[ "  = ([ '  N 7~) U ( I  n ~') .  
Note that  I '  C_ I "  C_ I .  We have: 
(a) I" ~ P~B. In fact, for all rules R of P~B we have I '  ~ R. Then there are 
three possibilities: 
(a.1) I '  ~ a, for some a occurring in the head of R. 
(a.2) I' ~ Ba, for some ~Ba occurring in the body of R. 
(a.3) I '  ~= b, for some b E 7-t occurring in the body of R. 
In each case we have I "  ~ R. In fact: 
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(a.4) Prom (a.1) and I t _C Itt we have I 't ~ a, hence I "  ~ R. 
(a.5) Prom (a.2) and I t C I"  we have I "  ~ Ba, hence I "  ~= R. 
(a.6) From the definition of I t' we have ( I"  (? 7-/) = ( I '  N T/). Prom this fact 
and (a.3) conclude Itt ~= b, hence I t' ~ R. 
This is true for every rule of P~B; therefore, I "  ~ P~B. 
(b) I "  ~ S. In fact, the atoms of 7~ t are given the same truth value by I "  and I,  
and hence the assumption I ~ S implies I "  ~ S. 
Thus I "  is a model of P~B U S. It follows that I "  = I,  because I is a minimal 
model of P~B U S. Prom the definition of Itt and from the above equality conclude 
( I ' n TI) = ( I 't N 7-l) = (I N 7-l). This contradicts the assumption ( I  t r~ 7-/) ¢ ( I  c) 7-/). 
[] 
Now we prove that the least GSE of P~B U SA is a correct and complete repre- 
sentation of the stationary semantics. In the following 8p~BuSA will be abbreviated 
by 8, and (Sp~uSA 7 a) will be abbreviated by 8~. 
Lemma A.IO (Correctness). Let $5 be the stationary state of P. For all ordinals 
(i) Pl V -- • V Pn E 8 + implies Bpl V •. • V Bpn E S~. 
(ii) -'Pl V . - .  V ~Pn E 8 + implies ~Bp~ V . . .  V ~Bpn E $5. 
(iii) Pl A -.. Apn E 8~ implies ~Bpt V . . . V ~Bpn E S~. 
(iv) I f  I is a minimal model of PvB u $6, then I ~ Cons(P~B U SA, 8~). 
The proof of this lemma needs the following two auxiliary lemmas. 
Lemma A.11. For all.a, if ~q E 8~,  then q E 8 +. 
PROOF. By induction on a. 
a = O: trivial. 
a = 3' + 1: Assume that -q  E 0~.  There are two possibilities: either q E (9 + 
or q ¢ 0 +. In the first case, the lemma follows immediately because q E @+ C 
+ 0~+ I = 0 +. In the second case, define B'  = @~ U (0, {q}). Note that: 
(a) B t is a belief state. 
(b) Cons(P~BUSA, B') = Cons(P~BUSA, O~)UCons(SA, (O, {q}}) = Cons(P~BU 
SA, 8~) u {~q}. 
(c) Cons(P~B USA, B t) ~- ~q (from (b)). 
(d) Cons(P~B USA, B')  must be inconsistent; otherwise, from (c) and Lemma 
2.2(vi), we would have -,q ¢ 8~+ 1 = 82 ,  which contradicts the assumption. 
(e) Cons(P~B USA, 8r )  ~- q, (from (b), (d), and the deduction theorem). 
(f) q E 8 (8~)  + = 8 + (from the previous point, by Lemma 2.2(v)). 
Finally, let a be a limit ordinal: If ~q E 8~,  then there must be a 7 such that 
7 < a and -~q E 8~.  By induction hypothesis, derive q E 8 +, which implies 
q~8~ +. [] 
Lemma A.12. Let I be a minimal model of P~B U S5 such that I ~ Pl A-. - A Pn, 
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, ) ' 'where pl , . . ,  p~ • 7-t. For all B, i f  Cons(P>8 USA, B) =0 {~a I ~t ~ 7-t L 7-t and 
I ~= a}, then Cor~s(P>B USA, B) P p~ A- . .  A P~z. 
PROOF. Suppose not. Then, for some P l , . - . , Pn  d ~,  some I and some .B we 
have: 
(a) [ ppl A'-'Apn. 
(b) Co'r~s(P>B U SA, B) D {~A j A ¢ ~ U ~ '  cmd I ~= A}. 
(c) Co'n,s(P~B U SA, B) ~p~ A . . .  A p,~. 
By (c), Cons(P~B U SA, B) must have a model I '  that  falsifies some ph(h 6 
{1,...,TL}). By (b), I '  is amode lo f{~A I A ¢ 7-/U7t'  and I  g- A} and hence, 
I '  C I. Thus Lemma A.9 can be applied to conclude ( I '  n 7t) = ( I  c~ 7t). However, 
this is absurd, because Ph must be true in I and false in I ' .  [] 
PROOF OF LEMMA A.10. (By induction on ct). The cases where ct = 0 or ct is a 
limit ordinal are easy and are left to the reader. Now suppose that. a =/3 + 1. 
(i) If Pl V . . .  V p,~ C (3 +, then Cons(P~B USA, 6),) k Pl V - . -  V Pn (by Lemma 
2.2(v)). Therefore, every minimal model of P>B U S~--being a model of Cor~s(P~B U 
SA, Off) by induction hypothesis ( iv ) - -must  satisfy pl v .-. V t)~- It follows that  
Pl V • -. V p~ E ECWA(P>B U $6) and hence, Bpl V. . .  v Bp,~ ¢ S~+I -- S~. 
(ii) Similar to the proof of (i). 
(iii) Suppose that  (iii) does not hold, that  is, Pl A . . .  A p,~ E 6) 2, but ~BP~ V 
• .. v ~Bp,~ ~ Se. Then ~Pl V ... V ~p,~  ECWA(P>~ O Se), that  is, there exists a 
minimal model I of P~R U S~, where Pl A -. • A p~,. is true. Define 
B1 : ({-~q ] q E ~ and I ~ ~Bq}, {q I q ~ ~t and I b ~q}), 
B2 = (~/3UB1.  
Now we prove three facts that  imply Pl A • • • A 1),~ ¢ O2. 
(a) B2 is a belief state, that  is, B + N By  = (3. In order to prove this, it shoukt 
be shown that: 
i. eTne; 
2. nsf =O. 
3. O~NB{ :0 .  
4. e~ nx~+ = O. 
(1) and (2) are left to the reader. (3) If q E e~,  then Bq E S~ (by induction 
hypothesis (i)) and hence, q must be true in every minimal model of PoB U S~, 
including I.  It  follows that  q cannot belong to B~-. (4) If ~q ~ (-)~i, then 
q ~ O~, by Lelnlna A.11. By induction hypothesis (i), Bq E S~ and hence, 
I ~ Bq. Consequently, ~ ¢ B1 +, 
(b) Cons(P>B U SA, B2) is consistent. This fact is proved by showing that  I is a 
model of Cons(P>s O SA, B2). In fact, Cor~s(P~B O SA, B2) can be rewritten 
as Cons(P~B USA,  IDf~) U Cons(SA, B1). By induction hypothesis (iv), we 
have I ~ Cons(P>B O SA, O~). We are left, to show that  I ~ Cons(SA, B~), 
which follows by noting that  Cons(SA, B1) is just the set of negative literals 
satisfied by I ,  that  is, Co'ns(SA, B1) = {~a l a E H OT-t' and I ~ ~a}. 
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(c) Cons(P~B USA, B2) F Pl A -.- A p~. It follows from Lemma A.12 by noting 
that 
Cons(P~B USA, B2) D Cons(SA, B1) 
= {-,a l a E ? /UT/ '  and I ~ ~a}. 
The previous facts, by Lemma 2.2(vi), imply Pl A ... A Pn ¢ (O~)-. A contra- 
diction. 
(iv) Let I be a minimal model of P~B U S5 and let ¢ E Cons(P~B USA, @a). 
There are four possibilities: 
(a) ¢ E PvB. Then obviously I ~ ¢. 
(b) ¢ = -~ql V.-. V-~qm. Then ¢ E Cons(P~s U SA, O~) only if ql A. . .  A qm E @~ 
which implies ~Bq~ V .. .  V ~Bqm E Se (by (iii)). It follows that ~q~ V -.. V 
-~qm E ECWA(P~B USe) and hence, ¢ is true in all the minimal models of 
PI>B U ~5, including I. 
(c) ¢ = Bql V . . .  VBqm. Then ¢ E Cons(P~B USA, (3~) only if ql V--. V q~ E @+ 
which implies Bq~ V . . .  V Bqm E Se (by (i)). It follows that I, being a model 
of Se, must satisfy ¢. 
(d) ¢ = ~Bql V. •. V-,Bqm. The proof that I satisfies ¢ is similar to the previous 
case. 
[] 
Lemma A. 13 (Completeness). Let B be the least fixed point of (3. For all ordinals 
OL: 
(i) Bpl  V • .. V Bpn E S~ implies Pl V • .. V Pn E B +. 
(ii) ~Bpl  V ... V ~Bp,~ E S~ implies Pl A ... A Pn E B - .  
(iii) S~ C Cons(P~B USA, B). 
The proof of Lemma A.13 requires the following Lemma: 
Lemma A. 14. Assume that Cons(P~B USA) D S¢~ holds, for some B and/3. If  I 
is a minimal model of Cons(P~B USA, B) and I ~ Pl A . . .  A Pn, then P~B U S~ 
has a minimal model I t such that I ~ ~ Pl A • • • A p~. 
PROOF. Assume that I is a minimal model of Cons(P~B USA, B) and that I 
Pl A. . .  Apn. Let NC be the set of negative clauses of Cons(SA, B) and PC be the 
set of positive clauses of Cons(SA, B). Note that 
Cons(P~B u SA, B) = Cons(P~B USA, B) U S z 
= P~B U Cons(SA, B) U SZ 
= P~BUPCUNCUS~.  
It is easy to see that every minimal model of P~B U PC U NC U S~ is also a minimal 
model of P~,B U PC  U S~, because NC contains only negative clauses. Thus, I is 
a minimal model of Pl>B U PC U S/3. Note that PC U S~ is a P-state. I is also a 
model of P~B U SZ and hence, there must be a minimal model I r of P~B U SZ such 
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that I '  C I. By Lemma A.9, we have I '  n ~ = I Cq 7-/ and hence, the assumption 
I I= p~ A. . .  A p,~ implies I '  ~ Pl A. . .  A Pn. [; 
Proof of Lemma A.13 (By induction on a). The base case and the limit case 
are trivial. We prove only the step case. Let a =/3 + 1. 
(i) Assume Bpl V . . .VBpn E Sa. We show that this implies pl V .- .Vpn E B +. 
By definition of S~+I,pl V ... V p~ E ECWA(P~B U Sf3) and hence, 
P~. u s~ ~- p~ v . - .  vp,~ (1) 
Note that Cons(P~BUSA, B) D P~B and (by induction hypothesis (iii) Cons(J%B U 
SA, B) _D S z. It follows that Cons(P>B USA, B) ~ P~B U S~; hence, by (1), 
Cons(P~BUSA, B) ~ plV...Vpn. By Lemma 2.2 (vii) this implies plV-..Vp,~ (~ B +. 
(ii) Suppose that (ii) does not hold, that is, there exists a clause ~Bpl V-. .  V 
~Bp,~ in S~ such that Pl A . . .  A p~ ¢ B - .  By Lemma 2.2(viii), there must be a 
belief state B' such that: 
(a) B' _~ B. 
(b) Cons(P~B USA, B') ~- Pl A- . .  A p,~. 
(c) Cons(P~B U SA, B') is consistent. 
Let I be a minimal model of Cons(P~B USA, B'). The following facts hold: 
(d) I ~ Pl A . . .  A p~ (from (b)). 
(e) Cons(P~B USA, B') D_ Cons(P~B u SA, B) ~ S 0 (by Lemma 2.2(i) and in- 
duction hypothesis (iii)). 
(f) There exists a minimal model I '  of P~B U SZ that satisfies Pl A .-. A p~. It 
follows from (e), (d), and Lemma A.14 
(g) ~Pl V . . .  V -.pn ¢ ECWA(Pt, B U SZ) (by (f)). 
However, then ~Bpl V .., V -,Bpn should not belong to S~+1 = S~. A contra- 
diction. 
(iii) Let qo be any member of Sa. We will show that ~o E Cons(P~B USA, B). 
There are two possibilities: 
(a) ~ = BplV . . .VBpn.  In this case, by ( i ) ,p lV . . .V  p~ E B +. It follows, 
from the definition of SA, that Bpl V .. • V Bpn E Cons(P~B USA, B), that 
is, ~ E Cons(P~B USA, B). 
(b) ~ = ~Bp~ V . . .  V~Bpn.  In this case, by (ii), pl A . . .  Ap,~ E B -  and 
hence, ~p~ V.. • V-~pn E Cons(P~B U SA, B). By Lemma 2.2(vii), this implies 
~Pl V- • - V -,p~ E B +. From the definition of SA, it follows that ~Bpl V.. .  V 
~Bpn E Cons(P~B U SA, B), that is, g) ~ Cons(P~B tO SA, B). 
is true of arbitrary members of Sa, so we derive Sa C Cons(P~t~ u SA, B). This 
[] 
Theorem 5.1. Let P be a disjunctive program and let B = l f p 
(OPt.USA). 
(i) B is the least GSE of P~B USA. 
(ii) STN(P)  = B n (DHB, CHB). 
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PROOF. (i) P~B U $6 is consistent. Then P~B U S~ must have a minimal model I. 
We have: 
(a) for all ~, I ~ Cons(P~B u SA, Oa) (by Lemma A.10(iv). 
(b) I ~ Cons(P~B USA, B) (because B = O~, for some a). 
(c) (I, B) ~ P~B U SA (by Lemma 2.2(ii). 
(d) P~B USA is B-consistent. 
(e) B is a GSE of P~B U SA (from (d) and Lemma A.2 (viii)). 
(f) B is the least GSE of P~B U SA (from (e) and Theorem 2.4). 
(ii) It follows easily from Lemma A.10(i, iii) and Lemma A.13(i, ii). [] 
Ignorance Tests 
We assume the reader to be familiar with the definitions and results of [35]. 
Lemma A. 15. Let p, q be distinct atoms, P be a program, and d be a disjunction 
in DHB. If p V q E P, then, under the strong semantics: 
(i) Q is a basis for d in P only if Q is a basis for d in P U {p}. 
(ii) Q is a basis for d in P U {p} only if d has a basis Q~ in P such that Q' = Q 
or  Q' = Q u {q}. 
Under the weak semantics: 
(iii) Q is a basis (resp. a weak basis) for d in P only if Q is a basis (resp. a weak 
basis) for d in P U {p}. 
(iv) Q is a basis for d in P U {p} only if Q is a (possibly weak) basis for d in P. 
(v) Q is a weak basis for d in P U {p} only if Q is a weak basis for d in P. 
Proof (Sketch). (i) and (iii) are trivial, since every derivation from P can be 
done also in P U {p}. 
(ii) Let Q be a basis for d in P U {p}. Then there exists a weak derivation from 
P U {p}, having the form Q1, . . . ,  Q~, where Q1 = d and Qn = Q. Obtain a similar 
derivation Q~,. . . ,  Q~, from P, by the following method: 
• Set  Q~ = d. 
• If Qi+l is obtained from Qi by means of a program rule R ~ p and a derivation 
rule Sj, then construct Q~+I from Q~ by means of R and Sj. 
• If Qi+l is obtained from Qi by means of the program rule p (and hence $1 
is the only applicable inference), then construct Q~+I from Q~ by means of 
$2 and p V q. 
In the last case, for some d and d ~, we have 
Qi+l = Qi\{d}, 
Q~+I -- (Q~\(d}) u {-~q}. 
From this fact, by a simple induction argument, it can be proved that either Q~ = Qi 
or Q~-- Qi u {~q}, fo r i - -  1 , . . . ,n .  Let Q '= Q~n. For what we said before, we 
have that either Q' -- Qn = Q or Q' -- Qn u {~q} -- Q u {-~q}. This completes the 
proof of (ii). 
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(iv) and (v) Let Q be a possibly weak basis for d in P U {p}. Then there 
exists a weak derivation from P U {p}, having the form Q1,. . .  Qn, where Q1 = d 
and Qn = Q. Obtain a similar derivation Q~,...,Q~n, from P, by the following 
method: 
• Set Q~ = d 
• If Q~+I is obtained from Q~ by means of a program rule R ¢ p and a derivation 
rule Wj, then construct Q~+I from Q'~ by means of R and Wj. 
• If Qi+l is obtained from Qi by means of the program rule p (and hence W1 
is the only applicable inference), then construct Q~+I from Q~ by means of 
W2 and p V q. 
By a simple induction argument, it can be proved that Qi = Q~, for i = 1 , . . . ,  7~,. 
It follows that Q~ = Qn = Q and hence, Q is a basis for d in P (or a weak basis. 
if W2 has been applied). [] 
Lemma 5.2. Let SEM be the weak well-founded semantics for disjunctive programs 
and let p, q be distinct atoms. Then, for all P, 
SEM(PU {p V q}) C SEM(PU {pV q} U {p}). 
PROOF. Since every disjunction d in SEM(P  U {p V c}) + U SEM(P  U{p V c})- 
has a level l(d), it suffices to show that, for all ordinals l, 
SEM(PU {pV q})[l C_ SEM(PU {p V q} U {p}), 
where B[z is an abbreviation for (B + cl {d I l(d) = l} ,B-  N {d I l(d) = l}}. The 
proof is by induction on 1. 
(1 = 0): Trivial (note that SEM(P  U {p v c})10 = ~). 
(l > 0): We have to show that: 
(a) SEM(P  U {p V q})l + C SEM(P  U {p V q} U {p})+. 
(b) SEM(P  U {pV q})[/- C_ SEM(P  U {pV q} U {p})-. 
(a) If d E SEM(P  U {p V c})l +, then d has a false child in the associated global 
tree, such that l(d') < l(d) = 1. By Lemma A.15(iii), d' is a child of d also in the 
global tree associated to P U {p V c} U {p}. Moreover, by induction hypothesis, d' is 
false in SEM (P U {p V q} U {p}). It follows that d is true in SEM(P  U {p V q} U {p}), 
i.e., d • SEM(P  U {p V q} U {p})+. This proves (a). 
(b) We show that the negation of (b) leads to a contradiction. Suppose that, for 
some d,d • SEM(PU {p V c})l~-, but d • SEM(PU {pV q} U {p})-. Then, in the 
global tree associated to P U {p V q } U {p}, d must have a child d', which is not true, 
and whose level is strictly smaller than l. By Lemma A.15(iv, v), d ~ is a child of d 
also in the global tree associated to P O {p v q}. Moreover, by the contrapositive 
of the induction hypothesis, d' is not true in SEM(P  U {p V c}). It follows that d 
is not false in SEM(P  U {p V c}). A contradiction. [] 
Lemma 5.3. Let SEM be the strong well-founded Semantics, let P be a disjunctive 
program, and let p, q, c be distinct atoms, where c does not occur in the heads of 
the rules of P. Finally, let P~ = P U {p V q,p V c}. Then some of the foli:owing 
conditions hold: 
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• SEM(P ' )  C SEM(P '  U {p}). 
• SEM(P ' )  = SEM(P 'U  {q}). 
The proof of Lemma 5.3 needs the following result: 
Lemma A. 16. Under the assumptions of Lemma 5.3, we have that, for all active 
strong derivations d V c, Q1 , . . . ,Qn  from P', where Qn does not contain ~p, 
there exists an active strong derivation d, Q~I, . . . , Q~m from P' u {p} such that 
Q" = Qn. 
Proof (Sketch). By induction on n. 
(n = 0): The lemma is vacuously true: since d V c is not empty, all of its active 
derivations have nonzero length. 
(n > 0): There are three possibilities: 
Q1 is obtained by rewriting dVc with pVc and $1. Then p must be contained 
in d and hence, we can define Q~ by rewriting d with p and S1. Note that 
Q~ = Q1 = D, so the lemma holds in this case. 
Q1 is obtained by rewriting d V c with p V c and $2. In this case there are 
two possibilities, corresponding to the possible applications of p V c and $2: 
either Q1 = {~p} or Q1 = {-~c}. The first case contradicts the hypothesis, 
so we have Q1 = {~c}. This derivation is possible only if p is contained in 
d V c. Since p ~ c, it follows that p is contained in d. Thus, we can rewrite d 
with p V c and $2, obtaining Q~ = {~c} = Q1. 
Q1 is obtained by rewriting d V c with a program rule R ¢ p V c and a 
derivation rule Sj. Also d can be rewritten by means of R and Sj, because, 
by hypothesis, c does not occur in the head of R. Let Q~ be the resulting oal. 
Note that for each extended literal 11 E Q~, there is a corresponding literal 
1 E Q1, such that either l ---" 1 / or l = l ~ Vc. From QI , . - -  Q,~, we can extract a 
strong active derivation starting from I. Let Q(l) be the corresponding basis. 
By induction hypothesis, l' has an active derivation with basis Q(l') = Q(l). 
Construct Q~, . . . ,Q~ by merging these derivations, for all l' E Q~. It is 
easy to see that Q~ = [_J~,~Q~ Q(l') = Ut~Q1 Q(l) = Qn. This completes the 
proof. [] 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.3. There are two possibilities: 
(a) p e SEM(P ' ) -  (i.e., p is false in SEM(P ' ) ) .  
(b) p • SEM(P ' ) -  (i.e., p is not false in SEM(P ' ) ) .  
(a) In this case q is true in SEM(P ' ) .  In fact, q has a basis {~p} (obtained 
through p V q and $2), so p is a child of q in the global tree. Then q has a false 
child and hence, q is true. It follows easily that 
SEM(P ' )  = SEM(P '  U {q}). 
(b) In this case, we will show that 
SEM(P ' )  C SEM(P '  U {p)). 
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It suffices to show that, for all ordinals l, 
SEM(P') I  z C_ SEM(P '  U {p}) 
(see Lemma 5.2). The proof is by induction on 1. 
(l = 0): Trivial (note that SEM(P')Io = 0). 
(1 > 0): Let d be any member of SEM(P') I  +. Since d is true, it must have a false 
child d', in the associated global tree, such that l(d') < l(d) = l. By lemma A.l.5(i), 
d ~ is a child of d in the global tree associated to P' U {p}. Moreover, by induction 
hypothesis, d' is false in SEM(P 'U {p}). It follows that d is true in SEM(P 'U {p}), 
i.e., d ¢ SEM(P '  U {p})+. This proves that SEM(P') I  + C_ SEM(P '  U {p})+. 
Now assume that, for some d,d ~ SE2FI(P')I[-, but d ¢ SEM(P '  U {p})-. We 
show that this leads to a contradiction. 
Since d is not false in SEM(P '  U {p}), d must have a child d~ in the associated 
global tree, such that dl is not true. 
By Lemma A.15(ii), d has a corresponding child d2 in the global tree of P~, such 
that either d2 = dl or d2 = dl Vc. 
We have d2 ¢ dl. In fact, by assumption, d is false in SEM(P  ~) and hence, d2 
must be true in SEM(P~). By induction hypothesis, this implies that d2 is true in 
SEM(P '  U {p}). Since dl is not true in SEM(P '  U {p}), we have de ¢ dr. 
It follows that d2 = dl V c. Since d2 is true in SEM(P~), d2 must have a false 
child d3 in the corresponding lobal tree. Now, there are two possibilities: either 
d3 contains p or d3 does not contain p. 
The first case is impossible: since d3 is false, all of its disjuncts are false, too, 
while p is not false by (b). 
Conclude that d3 does not contain p. Then, by Lemma A.16, we have that 
d3 is a child of dl also in the global tree associated to P~ U {p}. Moreow,r, by 
induction hypothesis, d3 is false in SEM(P  ~ U {p}). It follows that dl must be true 
in SEM(P '  U {p}). A contradiction. [] 
Theo~rm 5.~. If p, q are independent in P>u, then 
STN(P)  C STN(P  U {p}). 
The proof of this theorem needs the following two technical emmas. 
Lemma A.IT. Let S, S' be P-states such. that S G S'. Then 
Ord(ECWA(P~B U S)) C_ Ord(ECWA(g~u U S')). 
PROOF. Suppose not, that is, suppose that there exists an ordinary sentence ~ c 
EUWA(P>B U S) that is false in some minimal model I '  of P>a U S'. I '  is also a 
model of P>B U S and hence, there exists a minimal model I of P~B U S such that 
I c I ' .  By lemmaA.9  we have ( I  N J-l) = ( I '  c3 7- 0 . Then ~ must be given the 
same truth value by I and I ' ,  that is, ~ must be false in I. However, this implies, 
¢ ECWA(P~B U S), contradicting the assumption. [] 
Lemma A.18. If p, q are independe~t in P~B, then ]or all P-states S, 
Ord( ECWA( P~ U S) ) c_ Ord( ECWA( P~u u {p} U S)), 
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PROOF. Suppose not, that is, suppose that there exists an ordinary sentence ~p • 
ECWA(P~,B u S) that is false in some minimal model I of P~B U {p} U S. Since 
p, q are independent in P~B, I must be a minimal model of P~B U S. It follows that 
qo ¢ ECWA(P~,B U {p V q} U S), which is absurd. [] 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4. Let So, $1,.. •, SOt,... be the transfinite sequence con- 
verging to the stationary state of P and let S~, S~,. . . ,  S~ . . . .  be the corresponding 
sequence converging to the stationary state of P U {p}. It suffices to show that for 
all a, SOt C_ S~. The proof is by induction on c~. The base case and the limit case 
are trivial. We prove only the step case. Assume a =/3 + 1. We have 
SOt I c ECWA(P B U SZ) 
and ~ has the form : Bpl V ... V Bpn 
or -,Bpl V . . .  V -~Bpn} 
c I e ECWA(P~B u St) 
and ~ has the form : Bpl V ... V Bpn 
or ~Bpl V . . .  V -,Bpn} (by Lemma A.17 since, by induction 
hypothesis, SZ C_ St) 
C {cfl [ ~ • ECWA(P~B U {p} U St) 
and ~ has the form : Bpl V ... V Bp~ 
or ~Bpl V . . .  V ~Bpn} (by Lemma A.18) 
--- I e ECWA([P u {P}]>B U St) 
and ~ has the form : Bpl V ... V Bp~ 
or -~Bpl V ... V -~Bpn} 
= S t ~+1 
= s ' .  
[] 
Lemma 5.4. Let p, q, c, c' be distinct atoms of ~,  with the exception of c and c', 
which may be equal. Let P be a disjunctive program, whose rule: contain neither 
c nor c' in their heads. Then p, q are independent in
P'  = [P U {(p V q), (p V c), (q, VC')}]bB. 
PROOF. We have to show that, for all P-states S: 
(a) MM(P 'U  S) C_ MM(P '  U {p} U S) U MM(P '  U {q} U S). 
(b) MM(P '  U S) D_ MM(P '  U {p} U S) U MM(P '  U {q} U S). 
(a) Let I be an arbitrary member of MM(P '  U S). It suffices to show that 
I E MM(P '  U {p} U S) U MM(P '  U {q} U S). By assumption, I satisfies either p or 
q. Assume I ~ p, without loss of generality. Then I is a model Of P' U {p} U S. All 
the models of P '  U {p} U S are also models of P '  U S and hence, none of them can 
be strictly smaller than I, by assumption. It follows that I 6 MM(P '  U {p} U S) 
and hence, I e MM(P '  U {p} u S) U MM(P '  U {q} U S). 
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(b) Let I be an arbitrary member of MM(P'  u {p} U S) U MM(P'  U {q} u S). 
It suffices to show that assuming I ¢2 MM(P  ~ u S) leads to a contradiction. There 
are two possibilities: 
(b.1) I E MM(P 'U  {p} U S). 
(b.2) I c MM(P 'U  {q} U S). 
First assume (b.1). If I ~ MM(P '  U S), then there exists an interpretation 
I' ~ MM(P  ~ U S) such that I ~ u I. I '  cannot be a model of p; otherwise (b.1) 
would not be satisfied. Therefore, in order to satisfy p V q, I ~ must satisfy q, i.e., 
q c I', which implies q E I. Similarly, .in order to satisfy p V c, I '  must satisfy c and 
hence, c c I. Now consider the interpretation 1\{c}, which is strictly smaller than 
I. We have: 
(c) I \{c} ~ P~B. In fact, by assumption, c does not occur in the heads of the 
rules of P~B. Consequently, I \{c} and I satisfy the same heads. Similarly, 
~c does not occur in the bodies of the rules of P~B (because, by assumption, 
c E 7-( hence c ¢ 7-('); therefore, I \{c} satisfies at most the same bodies that 
are satisfied by I. From the previous facts, it follows easily that I satisfies 
a rule R 6 P~B only if I\{c} satisfies R, too. Since I b P~B, this implies 
I \{c} I= P~B. 
(d) I \{c} ~ {(p V q), (p V e), (q V c')}. By (b.1), I satisfies p and hence, p e I. 
Moreover, we have proved that q ~ I. Since p,q, c are distinct atoms (by 
hypothesis), we have that I'\{c} contains p and q. It follows that. I\{c} I= 
{(p v q), (p v c), (q v c')}. 
(e) I \{c} ~ P'. Note that P '  = [P O {(p V q),(p V c), (q v c')}]~B = P~B t{(PV 
q), (p V c), (q V e')}. Then (e) follows immediately from (c) and (d). 
(f) I \{c} ~ {p} O S. From the hypothesis, derive c 7 & p and c ¢ 7-/'. It follows 
that c does not occur in {p} U S and hence, eliminating e from I does not 
change the valuation of {p} U S. 
By (e) and (f), we have that I\{c} is a model of P '  U {p} U S. However, then, I 
cannot be a minimal model of P'  U {p} O S, which is absurd. 
The proof for case (b.2) is symmetrical to the one for (b.1). [] 
APPENDIX  B: YET  ANOTHER WELL-FOUNDED SEMANTICS  
Here we prove that the formulation of the well-founded semantics adopted in this 
paper is equivalent to the other formulations. First we recall some results, due to 
Baral and Subrahmanian: 
Proposition B.1 ([4]). 
(i) WF(P)  = (Ifp(yI2p),-gfp(1-I~)}. 
(ii) l fp(II2p) = IIp(gfp(II2p) . 
(iii) gfp(H2p) = IIp(l fp(H2p) . 
Theorem B.1. Ifp(q!p) = WF(P).  
PROOF. Let B = l fp(~p). We have to show the following facts: 
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(a) B C WF(P) .  
(b) B D_ WF(P) .  
In order to prove (a), it suffices to show that  WF(P)  is a fixed point of ~I/p. We 
have 
~p(WF(P)) = (IIp(-WF(P)-),-IIp(WF(P)+)) by def. of ~p 
= ( I Ip (g fp (Y IUp) ) , -F ip ( l fp (H2p) ) )  by Proposition B.l(i) 
= ( l fp ( I I2p) , -g fp ( I I2p)}  by Proposition S.l( i i ,  iii) 
= WF(P) .  
We are left to prove (b). By Proposit ion B.l( i ) ,  it suffices to show that: 
(c) B + 2 lfp(n~). 
(d) B-  _~-gfp(nL). 
(c) can be proved by showing that B + is a fixed point of 1-I~,. We have 
B + = t~p(B) + 
: np( -B - )  
= I Ip ( - t~p(B) - )  
= r ip(he(B+))  
: .  n~(B+) .  
Similarly, (d) can be proved by showing that -B -  is a fixed point of I I~. We 
have 
-B -  = -~p(B) -  
= He(B +) 
= I Ip (V~p(B)  +) 
= nz(np( -B - ) )  
= r I~( -B - ) .  
This completes the proof. [] 
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